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A PROLONGED SLUMP FOR "PLAINTIFFPITCHERS": THE NARROW "STRIKE ZONE"
FOR SECURITIES PLAINTIFFS IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
MARC I. STEINBERG* AND DUSTIN

L. APPEL"

This Article focuses on the narrow "strike zone" that plaintiffs
must overcome in private securities actions instituted in the
Fourth Circuit. Based on empirical data generated over a
fourteen-year span, there emerges a clearfinding that during that
time period defendants were victorious in almost all cases, either
on the merits of the case or due to procedural obstacles. The
authorsposit that this pattern of difficulty for plaintiffs arises, at
least in part,from the Fourth Circuit's restrictive interpretationof
various requisite elements of these causes of action, such as
materiality and scienter,as well as the Fourth Circuit's approach
to the pleading standards mandated by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The authors examine in detailsome of the leading securities cases
that establish Fourth Circuitprecedent in these areas, as well as
notable cases from the survey period, to illustrate the confines of
the narrow "strike zone" available to plaintiffs to establish a
meritoriousclaim.
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I. TRYING TO GET THE BALL OVER THE PLATE

The Official Rules of Major League Baseball' define the strike
zone-the target area that designates a "good" pitch-as follows:
The Strike Zone is that area over home plate the upper limit of
which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the
shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower level
is a line at the hollow beneath the knee cap. The Strike Zone
shall be determined from the batter's stance as the batter is
prepared to swing at a pitched ball.2
1. The current rules of Major League Baseball were codified and adopted in 1949
and have been amended many times throughout the years. See PLAYING RULES COMM.,
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES, at i (2008), available at
http:l/mlb.mlb.comlmlb/downloadsly2OO8lofficial rules/001_introduction.pdf. The basic
structure of the rules, however, has changed remarkably little since they were first
transcribed in the mid-1800s by Alexander Joy Cartwright of the New York
Knickerbockers, one of the first athletic clubs to popularize the game of baseball. See
generally ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 10-12 (1998)
(describing the origins of baseball and its rules).
2. PLAYING RULES COMM., supra note 1, at 23-24. For a detailed examination of
how the area of the strike zone has changed over time, see The Strike Zone: A
Chronological Examination of the Official Rules by Baseball Almanac,
(last visited
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/articles/strike-zone-ruleshistory.shtml
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As this description shows, the strike zone has no objectively
measurable area-unlike, for example, the rigidly defined height and
width of the goal space in ice hockey or soccer.3 Instead, the strike
zone varies, not only from batter to batter, but even from pitch to
pitch depending on factors such as the player's height and the stance
assumed before each throw. Perhaps because of this inherent
variability, baseball provides a rich source of metaphors for many
areas of life. The law is no exception, particularly with regard to the
obstacles potential plaintiffs face when bringing suit; the unique facts
of each case, the basic fluidity of the law, and the subtle glosses
applied by separate jurisdictions (as well as individual judges)
combine to ensure that even similar cases may not always be decided
in exactly the same fashion. These factors necessarily affect the
"strike zone" that a plaintiff will confront in any given instance.
In this regard, plaintiffs in private securities actions4 face a
challenging set of circumstances. This was true even before passage of
Aug. 26, 2010). "Home plate" or "home base," where the batter stands to receive a pitch,
is denoted by a five-sided slab of whitened rubber fixed in the ground level with the
ground surface. PLAYING RULES COMM., supra note 1, at 2-4. Home plate is formed by a
"17-inch square with two of the corners removed so that one edge is 17 inches long, two
adjacent sides are 8 1/2 inches and the remaining two sides are 12 inches and set at an
angle to make a point," and it is the starting point to determine the placement of most
other important features of the playing field, such as the "diamond" shape formed by the
bases. Id. Second base is placed 127 feet, 3 3/8 inches from home plate, and first and third
bases are then placed at the intersection of lines measured 90 feet from home plate and
second base so that the distance from first to third will also equal 127 feet, 3 3/8 inches. Id.
3. The dimensions of the hockey and soccer goals are 6 feet (1.8 meters) wide by 4
feet (1.2 meters) high, and 8 yards wide (7.32 meters) by 8 feet (2.44 meters) high,
respectively. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, LAWS OF

THE GAME 2009-2010, at 9 (2009), available at http://www.fifa.com/mmldocument/
affederation/federation/81/42/36/lawsofthegameen.pdf; NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE,
OFFICIAL RULES 2007-2008, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.nhl.com/ext/
0708rules.pdf. Soccer is, of course, the term used in the United States to refer to the sport
that most countries know as simply "football." This name originated in newspapers such as
the New York Times as early as 1906 to distinguish the game "association football" from
the "gridiron" form of the game that would eventually become American football. See
DAVID WANGERIN, SOCCER IN A FOOTBALL WORLD 23-24 (2008); infra note 131.

4. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is the primary anti-fraud
provision of the federal securities regulation scheme. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Pursuant
to its rule-making authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which works in conjunction with the statute to provide civil and
criminal liability for certain deceptive or manipulative conduct in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). Although neither section 10(b)
nor Rule 10b-5 expressly provide for a private right of action by aggrieved purchasers or
sellers, the Supreme Court has recognized an implied right of action for violation of these
provisions. See Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that
"[t]he existence of this implied [section 10(b)] remedy is simply beyond peradventure").
To establish a claim under this private right of action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) requisite
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the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") in 1995, 5
which significantly narrowed the defined strike zone available to
plaintiffs. 6 For example, one statistical study has shown that the two

federal circuits that historically represent the bulk of private securities
actions, the Second and Ninth,7 dismissed well over half of the class

action complaints filed in their circuits between 1996 and 2003.8
Moreover, obtaining class action certification often poses an even
more troublesome obstacle to potential plaintiffs.9

jurisdictional means; (2) as a purchaser or seller of the subject securities; (3) an actionable
disclosure deficiency, such as a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant;
(4) scienter (signifying intentional or knowing misconduct); (5) a requisite connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (6)
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (7) economic loss; and (8) loss
causation. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008); MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 243-45 (5th ed. 2009).
5. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 491501, 505-17 (1995) (outlining the approaches courts took to decide private securities
actions). In fact, some assert that the very notion of a private right of action in securities
fraud cases is the target of sustained judicial attack. In the recent Stoneridge case, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg in dissent, criticized "the Courts
continuing campaign to render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless."
Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For further discussion of judicial
interpretations narrowing the scope of the private right of action since its original
recognition, see generally Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOB-5, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1310-16 (2008).
6. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to -2, 78j-1, 78u-4 to -5 (2006)).
Adopted in 1995, the PSLRA puts plaintiffs to a heightened pleading standard for
scienter, provides special protections for forward-looking statements made by publiclyheld companies, and imposes additional requirements with respect to securities class
actions, among other requirements that generally disfavor plaintiffs. Id. The express
purpose of the legislation was to act as "a check against abusive litigation by private
parties." See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
7. A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud?An EmpiricalStudy of
Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 125, 140 (2005). In 2007, complaints in these two circuits constituted over
action
filings
nationwide.
securities
class
percent
of
federal
sixty
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 21 (2008),
http://lOb5.pwc.com/PDF/2007%20SECURITY %20LIT%20STUDY%20W-LT.PDF. By
contrast, the Fourth Circuit saw two percent of such filings. Id.
8. Pritchard & Sale, supra note 7, at 142.
9. See, e.g., Gariety v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2004)
(stating that class certification issues require "rigorous analysis" (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of
the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). Note, however, that the private right of
action can extend to actions against control persons, directors and officers, and other
professionals such as lawyers and accountants. See generally 4 BROMBERG AND
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 7:333-7:383 (2d ed.
2008) (describing scope of liability under securities fraud statutes).
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With this background in focus, it appears that, particularly for
securities plaintiffs in decisions handed down by the Fourth Circuit,
the strike zone is very narrow indeed. Based on the authors'
examination of private federal securities actions decided by the
Fourth Circuit since 1995, defendants customarily and routinely have
emerged victorious. This Article provides an empirical examination of
these cases over that period, and it posits an explanation for this
consequence stemming from the development of Fourth Circuit case
law, beginning in 1995. Significantly, the Fourth Circuit experienced a
marked increase in class action securities filings during this period,
especially in the late nineties,10 perhaps in part due to the growth of
the high technology industry in Virginia and Maryland.1 1 Thus, even
as the volume of cases expanded over time, plaintiffs continued to
enjoy only isolated successes-perhaps in large part due to the
narrow strike zone recognized by that appellate court. A closer look
at the data and the underlying cases supports this view.
II. RUNNING "THE NUMBERS":

12

SURVEY OF CASES SINCE

1995

The authors examined both published and unpublished appellate
level decisions on federal securities cases handed down by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit13 for the period

10. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 943-44 (2003). For example, in 1997, just over one percent of
nationwide securities class action suits were filed in the Fourth Circuit, but that figure rose
to over five percent in 2000. Id.
11. See id. (noting that more research is required to confirm the correlation). Virginia
and Maryland actively sought to develop their high technology markets during this time in
various ways, including the adoption of legislation favorable to high technology firms. See
Deborah Tussey, UCITA, Copyright, and Capture, 21 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 319,
360 (2003). For example, Fairfax County, Virginia, now claims over 6,200 technology
firms, including industry leaders such as Northrop Grumman's Information Technology
arm. Fairfax County Economic Development Authority, Industry Sectors in Fairfax
County, http://www.fairfaxcountyeda.org/industry-sectors.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2010);
Systems,
Information
About
Systems,
Information
Grumman
Northrop
http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
12. Statistical measures (or a player's "numbers") are important in baseball. This is
certainly so for pitchers, whose performance from game to game may be more difficult to
predict than that of other positions-often because so many factors outside the player's
control affect the results of each outing, such as the ability of batters to "crush" weak
pitches and how well the fielders and basemen perform their tasks during the game. See
Keith Woolner & Dayn Perry, Why Are Pitchers So Unpredictable?, in BASEBALL
BETWEEN THE NUMBERS 48, 48-57 (Jonah Keri ed., 2006).
13. The Fourth Circuit includes Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
and West Virginia. For general information about the court, see http://www.ca4.uscourts
.gov/.
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January 1, 1995 to January 31, 2009-a fourteen-year span.14 The

scope of examination focused exclusively on private actions by
plaintiffs under the federal securities laws, i" and it excluded criminal
prosecutions instituted by the U.S. Department of Justice, civil
enforcement actions brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), as well as claims based on state securities laws
(or "blue sky acts") and state common law.16 This search produced a
final array of thirty-seven cases. 7

The array of cases reveals a pattern of particular difficulty for
plaintiffs over the period. Of the thirty-seven cases surveyed, with
near unanimity, defendants were victorious, either on the merits or
due to procedural obstacles to plaintiffs. 8 In fact, nearly half of these
cases were dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6) motions at the pleading stage. 19
None of the cases showed any clear win for the plaintiffs, and only

two cases resulted in a mixed outcome or reduced recoveryincluding one instance where, although the plaintiffs successfully
demonstrated liability, the amount of damages was held to be zero.2"
This pattern illustrates that plaintiffs in Fourth Circuit federal
securities cases have thrown an unusually low number of "strikes" in

14. Methodology: A broad field search of Fourth Circuit decisions was conducted
through Westlaw with the search command "securities exchange" or "federal /s securities
& DA (AFT 1/1/1995)." After excluding ERISA actions, bankruptcy cases, and criminal
and civil enforcement actions by the SEC, the final array of thirty-seven cases emerged.
These results represent the authors' good-faith effort to locate all Fourth Circuit federal
securities fraud cases within the scope of the survey period, but the authors cannot
guarantee that one hundred percent of such cases have been located.
15. These cases primarily involved actions brought under sections 10(b), 14(a), and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, as well as applicable Exchange Act rules thereunder.
16. Often, plaintiffs plead various state and common law claims, such as fraud, breach
of contract, and negligence, in addition to federal securities claims. In such cases, only the
dispositions of the federal securities claims have been considered.
17. See infra Table I.
18. See id.
19. See id. For example, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of complaints in
forty-six percent (seventeen of thirty-seven) of the cases surveyed. See id. Indeed, as Table
I shows, defendants were victorious in nearly all cases, on grounds such as grants of
motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and various procedural issues (such as running of
the statute of limitations). See id. The Fourth Circuit itself has acknowledged that the bar
for a securities fraud claim is particularly high. See, e.g., Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v.
Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 220 (4th Cir. 1994) ("At first blush, [these] principles may seem,
as a matter of policy, to require too much of a plaintiff in a securities case.").
20. See infra Table I. In Miller v. Asensio & Co., 364 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 2004), the
court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiffs that awarded zero damages, declining
to order a remand on the issue of damages. Id. at 234-35; see infra notes 301-03 and
accompanying text.
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the last fourteen years. 21 Accordingly, this Article provides a detailed

analysis of some of the leading cases from this period, evidencing that
21. Interestingly, however, in a case decided shortly after the end of the survey
period, the plaintiffs did manage to get one across the plate. In In re Mutual Funds
Investment Litigation, 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 78 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. June 28, 2010), the court
of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. Id. at 114-15. The classaction plaintiffs, certain shareholders of Janus Capital Group, Inc. ("JCG" or "Janus"),
alleged that the defendants, JCG and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Janus Capital
Management, LLC ("JCM"), violated section 10(b) by making misleading statements in
prospectuses for a number of Janus mutual funds during the class period. Id. The plaintiffs
also brought suit against JCG under the control-person provisions of section 20(a). Id. at
115.
The prospectuses at issue contained statements that the funds had adopted
policies and measures to prevent a practice known as "market timing." Id. at 116. Market
timing involves rapid trades made into and out of a mutual fund that exploit inefficiencies
in the fund's valuation process to produce quick profits at the expense of long-term
investors. Id. (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2008)). The
plaintiffs alleged that these statements were misleading because of the defendants'
admissions in a separate suit brought by the New York Attorney General in 2003 that they
had in fact, through secret agreements, expressly allowed certain hedge funds to engage in
market timing in the funds. Id. at 117-18. The Attorney General's revelation of these
secret trading pacts touched off massive withdrawals and redemptions from the funds that
swept away $14 billion of assets under management by JCM in a few short months. Id. at
118.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims against both entities
by ruling that, among other pleading defects, the complaint contained "no allegations that
JCG actually made or prepared the prospectuses" or that any of the statements were
directly attributable to JCG, and that the complaint failed to establish a nexus between
JCM, as investment adviser for JCG, and the plaintiffs, as shareholders of JCG. Id. (citing
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994)). The district court also dismissed the section 20(a) control-person claim against
JCG, based upon its finding that JCM had no primary liability under section 10(b). Id.
Reversing, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had successfully plead all of the
required elements to establish a claim under section 10(b) against JCM only, and that the
plaintiffs had thus also established a control-person claim against JCG. Id. at 131.
In so doing, the court of appeals confronted the question of whether the "fraudon-the-market" theory of reliance established by Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
241-42 (1988), requires direct attribution of the statement to the defendant. In re Mut.
Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 122 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 164). After
surveying the approaches adopted by the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the
court of appeals adopted the standard that, in the limited context of the fraud-on-themarket theory, a plaintiff must prove "that interested investors (and therefore the market
at large) would attribute the allegedly misleading statement to the defendant" to
demonstrate the element of reliance. Id. at 124. Under this test, the court of appeals found
that, because the market recognizes the dominance that investment advisers typically exert
over mutual funds, "interested investors would infer that JCM played a role in preparing
or approving the content" of the prospectuses, and thus the statements regarding market
timing were attributable to JCM. Id. at 127. By contrast, however, the court of appeals
found that the statements were not attributable to JCG under this test, since the investing
public would not so readily infer that the parent company that sponsors a family of funds
would take an active role in drafting or approving statements issued by the individual
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the difficulty could lie in the exacting standards for securities actions
that the Fourth Circuit has developed over time-standards that
arguably go far beyond the strictures of the PSLRA. Indeed, in
several cases, the Fourth Circuit's approach has been more restrictive
toward plaintiffs than that of other circuits. Even in several notable
cases that arose prior to the beginning of the survey period of this
Article (1995), both in the context of private suits as well as
government civil and criminal enforcement actions, the Fourth Circuit
has historically carved a narrow "strike zone."
III. SIZING UP THE NARROW "STRIKE ZONE": BACKGROUND ON
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

A.

PrivateActions

Two leading cases decided prior to 1995, Raab v. General Physics
Corp.22 and Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,'

illustrate the Fourth Circuit's stringent application of the materiality
element in private suits, and they provide the foundation for the
court's analysis in subsequent cases.24 In both cases, the plaintiffs filed
class action lawsuits against the companies and several of their
officers under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ("the
Exchange Act") for alleged misrepresentations contained in the
respective companies' financial reports and press releases.

In each

instance, the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the complaint,
reasoning that the statements at issue were not material as a matter of
law.26

funds. Id. at 128. The court of appeals noted that this finding was consistent with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Stoneridge Investment Partners,L. L. C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
552 U.S. 148 (2008), that deceptive acts that are not disclosed to the public are too remote
to satisfy the element of reliance, since Stoneridge has no application to situations where
statements were indisputably disseminated to the public. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566
F.3d at 127 (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161); see also infra note 315 (discussing
Stoneridge). As noted above, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case on June 28,
2010. Janus CapitalGroup, 78 U.S.L.W. at 3271.
22. 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993).
23. 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
24. See, e.g., Marsh Group v. Prime Retail, Inc., 46 F. App'x. 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2002)
(noting that because of Raab and Hillson, the court was "constrained to find that the
alleged misstatements in this case are immaterial and hence not actionable").
25. Hillson, 42 F.3d at 206-08; Raab, 4 F.3d at 288.
26. Hillson, 42 F.3d at 213-20; Raab, 4 F.3d at 290.
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The alleged misrepresentations in Raab included a prediction
that the company would enjoy an annual growth rate of ten to thirty
percent for the next several years and a representation that a
slowdown in awarding government contracts that had dampened the
company's financial results was only "administrative" and
"temporary," such that the results for the remainder of the fiscal year
would be "in line" with analyst expectations.27 Addressing the growth
prediction, the court held that the statement was an example of a
"soft" or "puffing" statement that, unless worded as a guarantee of
performance, was too indefinite to be material or to constitute a fraud
on the market-even though the company provided a discrete range
of percentages.2 8 In its treatment of materiality, the court expressly
differentiated predictions of future events from expressions of
opinion or belief about current conditions, which it noted stood "on a
different footing. '29 Congress would later codify this very distinction
in the PSLRA.3 °
With this distinction in mind, the court thereupon addressed the
company's statement that, because of the "administrative" nature of
the slowdown in the award of government contracts, "conditions in
the 1st quarter are temporary and that results during the remainder of
... 1992 should be in line with analysts' current projections."31
Although the statement was clearly an expression of opinion or belief
about current facts, the court focused on the term "temporary" to
determine that the statement was sufficiently indefinite to render it
not material.3 2 In the words of the opinion, "'[t]emporary' is an
indeterminate term: it could mean weeks, it could mean months, it
could mean years."33
Depending on the surrounding circumstances, the term
"temporary" may be indefinite standing alone. Nonetheless, the
Fourth Circuit's definition of "temporary" is inconsistent with the
term's commonly understood meaning.' Moreover, the Fourth
27. Raab, 4 F.3d at 287-88.
28. Id. at 289. Other courts have found statements that contained similar predictions
of growth or return on investment in these ranges to be material. See Cohen v. PrudentialBache Sec., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding a prediction of a "return
of 20% to 30%" to be material) (citing Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, 662 F. Supp. 957, 959
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
29. Raab, 4 F.3d at 290.
30. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2007).
31. Raab, 4 F.3d at 288.
32. Id. at 290.
33. Id.
34. The Fourth Circuit's reading is more expansive than the usual usage of the term,
which denotes a transitory or short duration. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (8th
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Circuit's analysis slights the context of the statement, which by its
terms limits the scope of the term "temporary" to the first quarter of
1992. Indeed, the court overlooked the date of the announcementMarch 30, 1992--only one day before the end of the first quarter.35
Taken in context, this representation conveys the subject company's
view that, in fact, the "temporary" slowdown in the award of
government contracts had already passed. By ignoring the clear
import of this language, the court's analysis bypassed an important
inquiry, namely, the impact that this expression of opinion on current
conditions had on a reasonable investor's decision-making processes.
In Hillson Partners, the Fourth Circuit expanded on the
materiality rationale laid out in Raab. The central facts in Hilson
Partners were similar, but with one exception: plaintiff-shareholders
challenged a series of statements made by the company and its CEO
at various points during the 1992 fiscal year concerning the company's
anticipated financial results for that specific period.36 For example,
the company made predictions about full-year revenues and net
income following the first, second, and third quarters, and it issued
statements concerning full-year and fourth-quarter results in
November and December 1992. 37 Relying on Raab, the court held
that the statements made after the first, second, and third quarters
were immaterial to the extent that they were predictions of future
results, regardless of the fact that the scope of future events
encompassed by the statements necessarily telescoped as the year
progressed." Flatly rejecting the proposition that an abbreviated time
frame could alter the nature of materiality, the court opined that
"[t]here is nothing in Raab ...that suggests a prediction of future
growth ceases to be a prediction of future growth simply because it is

ed. 2004) (defining "temporary" as "[lasting for a time only; existing or continuing for a
limited (usu. short) time; transitory"). Similarly, "temporary" is synonymous with other
terms such as "transient" that indicate a short-term condition. See id. at 1537 (defining
"transient" as "[tiemporary; impermanent; passing away after a short time"). The common
understanding of terms can be significant to determine the scope of federal securities
regulation. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574-76 (1995) (rejecting a
"capacious" reading of the term "prospectus" as contemplated by the Securities Act)
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (2d ed. 1910)); Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc.,
191 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (resorting to WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986) to help define the ordinary meaning of the word "any").
35. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 290-91.
36. Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 207-08 (4th Cir. 1994).
37. Id. at 207.
38. See id. at 213-14. As an example, the company issued statements predicting 1991
full-year financial results as early as May and as late as December of that year. Id.
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made six weeks rather than six months in advance."39 To support this
proposition, the court embraced the use of the term "temporary" that
was held not to be actionable in Raab, irrespective that this language
n
referred to results of the quarter then in progress."

Arguably taking this concept to an extreme, the Fourth Circuit
held that the company's challenged statements made in November

and mid-December (less than two weeks before the end of the
quarter and fiscal year) were also in the nature of future predictions,
instead of expressions of opinion or belief as to current events.4 ' In

addition, the court concluded that these two statements could not be

material both under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine42 and under a
Basic-style43 risk/magnitude analysis.'
A close reading of the language of the November and December
statements aids in deciphering the court's approach toward

application of these doctrines in this case. The November statement,
released in the company's third quarter report, read: "With Fort
Orange back operating at improved rates, Niagara Cold Drawn and
RedGo Properties performing exceptionally well, Relm showing

39. Id. at 214.
40. See id. at 213; Raab, 4 F.3d at 288. In Raab, the company issued a press release on
March 30 (only one day before the end of the quarter) stating its belief that "conditions in
the 1st quarter are temporary." Id.
41. Hillson Partners,42 F.3d at 214.
42. The "bespeaks caution" doctrine provides that when "an offering statement, such
as a prospectus, accompanies statements of future forecasts, projections, and expectations
with adequate cautionary language, those statements are not actionable as securities
fraud." In re Donald J. Trump Casinos Sec. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.N.J. 1992),
aff'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION 441-51 (5th ed. 2008) (outlining parameters of the bespeaks caution
doctrine); Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 BUS. LAW. 481
(1994) (examining limits of and rationale underlying the bespeaks caution doctrine
through various applications by the courts); Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a State of Mind, 58 U. PITr. L. REV. 619 (1997)
(comparing judicial and legislative approaches to the bespeaks caution doctrine).
43. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1998), the Supreme Court defined
materiality in terms of what a reasonable investor would consider important in making a
particular voting or investment decision. Id. at 232. This analysis includes a balancing of
the probability that the event will occur and the magnitude of its effect. Id. at 238-39; see
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (opining that
materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
the totality of the company activity"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Importantly,
misstated or omitted information does not have to be such that it would change the
investor's decision; but, instead, there must be a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would view it "as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
44. Hillson Partners,42 F.3d at 211-19.
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significant improvements over 1990 and 1991 and reduced costs at
Allister, we should have an excellent fourth quarter and see
significant improvements during 1993."" 5 The December statement
appeared in the Wall Street Journal: "Adage, Inc. expects to have a
better fourth quarter and year in sales and overall net income than a
year ago, said Robert H. Cahill, president."46
The language of the two questioned statements reveals the truly
expansive protection that the Hillson Partners court extended to
ostensibly forward-looking corporate communications. First, although
the November statement was forward-looking in the sense that it
predicted fourth quarter results, it was issued at the mid-point of the
quarter when at least half of the period's activity was already a
present fact, while the December statement came a scant two weeks
from the end of the quarter.47 Further, the November prediction
clearly relies on the effect of past as well as current events rather than

assumptions about events in the remaining six weeks of the quarter.
Under this broad application of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, it
appears that any forward-looking aspect contained in a
communication can inoculate the entire statement from being
deemed material.
This expansive approach stands in contrast to the positions
adopted toward forward-looking statements in other circuits, even in
the wake of the heightened requirements implemented by the
PSLRA. 4 For example, the Eleventh Circuit found that a press
release that predicted quarterly earnings issued on the last day of a
quarter was a forward-looking statement-but only because two of
five items that the company cited in a "laundry list" of contributing
factors were assumptions rather than observed facts.49 The court
noted that statements based upon observed facts, such as the current
rate of customer orders or input prices, were not forward-looking and
only the presence of the two assumptions brought the statement
within the safe harbor.5" Similarly, the Third Circuit held that when
projections are so related to representations about current facts that
45. Id. at 216.
46. Id. (quoting Adage Expects Quarter and Year to Improve upon 1991 Results,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1992, at A7).
47. Id. at 215. The court noted in passing the timing of the announcements, but it
considered timing alone to be inadequate to meet the pleading requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id.
48. See, e.g., EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 873-75 (3d Cir.
2000); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799,805-06 (11th Cir. 1999).
49. Ivax, 182 F.3d at 806.
50. Id.

2010]

SECURITIES PLAINTIFFS IN THE 4TH CIRCUIT

the validity

of the

projections

necessarily

turns

on

1935
those

representations, they could not be found immaterial as a matter of

law under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.5 In comparison to these
cases, Raab, Hillson Partners,and their progeny illustrate the narrow

"strike zone" employed by the Fourth Circuit in private securities
laws actions.
B.

Government Enforcement Actions

Although government civil and criminal enforcement actions are
outside the scope of our empirical study of federal securities cases, 2
51. EchoCath, 235 F.3d

at 879; see also COMM. OF CONFERENCE, JOINT

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF

1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 43-45 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.

730, 742-44 (crafting a broad safe harbor from private liability for forward-looking
statements including codification of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine).
52. In the same vein, our empirical study focused exclusively on private federal
securities law claims and excluded state securities law ("blue-sky" actions), as well as other
state law claims, such as breaches of fiduciary duty, adjudicated in the federal courts. See
supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. Such state law claims may also give some
indication of the Fourth Circuit's approach to interpreting the federal securities laws. Not
surprisingly, the plaintiffs similarly appear to face significant obstacles to their claims
based on state law. For example, in one recent case, the Fourth Circuit applied Delaware
law to affirm the dismissal of a plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims in relation to an
allegedly unfair merger price because the plaintiff had opted to tender his shares for the
offered price, which the court of appeals deemed to be acquiescence to the transaction.
See Schwartz v. Blum, 309 F. App'x. 718, 718-20 (4th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Fourth
Circuit declined to limit expansive language in a Delaware Supreme Court case which has
been more narrowly construed by Delaware Court of Chancery decisions. Id. at 721
(stating that a shareholder who "'tendered his shares and accepted the merger
consideration' has 'acquiesced in the transaction and cannot [subsequently] attack it' "
(citing Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 848 (Del. 1987)) and declining to
apply an interpretation of a lower court which held that " 'a stockholder who casts a vote
in favor of, or later accepts the consideration from, a merger effected by a controlling
stockholder is not barred by the doctrine of acquiescence, or any other related equitable
doctrine such as waiver, from challenging the fairness of the merger' " (quoting In re JCC
Holding Co., 843 A.2d 713, 722-23 (Del. Ch. 2003))). In re Best Lock Corp. S'holder
Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1079 (Del. Ch. 2001) (interpreting the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Bershad to preclude a shareholder from challenging the merger consideration
only when such shareholder tenders her shares and affirmatively votes for ratification of
the merger). Similarly, in two earlier cases arising under Virginia law, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a common law fraud claim in a stock price drop case on the basis
that the plaintiff had failed to plead causation according to the standard articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), and it
granted summary judgment on a claim under the Virginia Securities Act for controlperson liability on the part of two outside directors, finding that their conduct fell within
an applicable statutory safe harbor. See Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 47680 (4th Cir. 2006); Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191, 194-97 (4th Cir. 2001). For
more discussion of the Dura pleading requirement for causation, see infra notes 304, 320
and accompanying text. In Dellastatious,because the Fourth Circuit held that the subject
defendants met the safe harbor afforded by the Virginia Securities Act for control person
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two notable enforcement cases also illustrate the Fourth Circuit's
approach to securities fraud claims, and both ultimately played a role
in defining the contours of liability for securities fraud. In the first of
these, United States v. Bryan,53 the Fourth Circuit rejected the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, 4 thereby
reversing criminal convictions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 55
Elton "Butch" Bryan, then the director of the West Virginia Lottery
("Lottery"), was convicted of securities fraud under these provisions
for purchasing securities in companies transacting business with the
Lottery on the basis of confidential, nonpublic information entrusted
to him in his official capacity. 6 As director of the Lottery, Bryan was
intimately involved in the negotiation and award of state contracts on
behalf of the Lottery, including those required for a planned
expansion of video lottery gaming in the state. 7 During 1991 and
1992, Bryan used nonpublic, confidential information to purchase
shares in three companies that were bidding for contracts with the
Lottery.5 8 One such transaction was for the purchase of three hundred
shares in the company, Video Lottery Consultants, occurring just
after the Lottery's decision to award the firm an exclusive contract to
supply video terminals. 9
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction, reasoning that the
language of section 10(b) as well as Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the scope of that statute did not support the

liability, which is more restrictive than the good faith defense available under section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006), the court of appeals also granted summary
judgment on the plaintiff's claims under federal securities law. Dellastatious,242 F.3d at
194-97; see infra note 313 and Table I.
53. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
54. The misappropriation theory is distinguished from the "traditional" or "classical"
theory of insider trading that prohibits insiders, such as executives or directors, from
trading in securities of their own corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information as a deceptive device within the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). By comparison, the misappropriation
theory also extends section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability to an actor who misappropriates
confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a fiduciary duty or a
relationship of trust and confidence owed to the source of the information. See United
States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997); WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 5.4 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008).
55. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
56. Id. at 937-39.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 939.
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misappropriation theory of liability. 6 According to the Fourth
Circuit, adoption of the misappropriation theory would impermissibly
expand the scope of the statute to include "simple breaches of
fiduciary duty" and violations of similar relationships. 6 Further, the
court of appeals held that the language of section 10(b) requires a
close nexus between deceptive conduct and the purchase or sale of a
security and that the wronged party itself must be either a purchaser
or seller of a security or "otherwise connected with or interested in
the purchase or sale of securities."'62
To reach this narrow conclusion, the court of appeals largely
relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green63 that "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indication that
Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation
or deception,"' and on the Santa Fe Court's definition of deception
as "the [knowing] making of a material misrepresentation or the
[knowing] nondisclosure of material information in violation of a duty
to disclose."65 The Fourth Circuit thereupon drew from the Supreme
Court's rulings in Chiarella v. United States,66 Dirks v. SEC,67 and
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.68 as support for the proposition that the anti-fraud provisions of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply to breaches of duties toward
purchasers or sellers of securities, or "at most," to investors or others
"closely linked" to a securities transaction.69 Because the
misappropriation theory imposes liability based on deception of the
60. Id. at 946-49 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); and
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
61. Id. at 945. Although it expressly rejected the misappropriation theory, the court
conceded that Bryan's conduct "clearly constituted criminal activity" under that standard.
Id.
62. Id. at 944.
63. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
64. Id. at 473.
65. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 470). See generally Ralph C.
Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lob-5 and the New
Federalism,129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980) (discussing the Santa Fe decision).
66. 445 U.S. 222, 228-312 (1980) (holding that, absent a duty to disclose based on
fiduciary duty or relationship of trust and confidence, trading on material nonpublic
information is not actionable under section 10(b)).
67. 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that section 10(b) liability of tippers-tippees
depends on "whether the insider [tipper] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly,
from his disclosure [and that] [albsent some personal gain, there has been no breach of
duty to stockholders [a]nd ...no derivative breach [by the tippee]").
68. 511 U.S. 164, 190-91 (1994) (holding that aiding and abetting is not actionable in
private section 10(b) actions).
69. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946-48.
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source of the information (a third party) that is unconnected to the
subject securities transaction, the court of appeals held that the
doctrine essentially rendered section 10(b)'s "in connection with"7
requirement meaningless.7 In rejecting this theory, the Fourth Circuit
expressed its concern that the doctrine would inject further ambiguity
"already uncertain law governing
into what the court termed the 72
fraudulent securities transactions.,

Subsequently, the Supreme Court disagreed and expressly
upheld the validity of the misappropriation theory in United States v.

O'Hagan.73 In its decision, the Court addressed the concerns raised by
the Fourth Circuit in Bryan. As a starting point, O'Hagan confirmed
that the misappropriation theory comports with the requirement of
deceptive conduct proscribed by section 10(b), observing that
misappropriation necessarily "involves feigning fidelity to the source
of [the] information. '74 Under this analysis, the "in connection with"
requirement is met because the fraud is not ultimately complete until
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). The requisite connection between a disclosure
deficiency and the purchase or sale of a security is an essential element of an action under
this provision. See supra note 4.
71. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949-50 (stating that the misappropriation theory "effectively
eliminates the requirement that a person in some way connected to a securities transaction
be deceived, allowing conviction not only where the 'defrauded' person has no connection
with a securities transaction, but where no investor or market participant has been
deceived").
72. Id. at 950-51.
73. 521 U.S. 642, 653-55 (1997). The defendant in this case, James O'Hagan, was an
attorney and partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney at a time when the firm was
hired to represent a British purchaser as local counsel in a prospective tender offer for the
Pillsbury Company. Id at 647. Although the project required that both the purchaser and
Dorsey & Whitney take precautions to keep the contemplated tender offer secret,
O'Hagan began purchasing call options on Pillsbury stock, eventually becoming the largest
individual holder of the company's unexpired options. Id. When the tender offer was
ultimately announced, O'Hagan netted a profit of more than $4.3 million. Id. at 648. For
more on the impact of O'Hagan on securities regulation, see generally BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 9, at § 6:500. Although the O'Hagan case arose in the Eighth
Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals in the case at bar relied upon
the ruling in Bryan to reject the misappropriation theory. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649-50.
74. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78
(1977)). Thus, if a fiduciary informs the source of the intent to trade on the information,
section 10(b) liability normally does not attach; however, the fiduciary may still be liable
for a state law breach of the duty of loyalty or a comparable obligation. Id.; see also
Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 342-48 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
corporate directors liable for breaches of fiduciary duties under state law although
plaintiffs failed to prove causation under federal securities claims); Gochnauer v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1050-51 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding broker liable for
breach of fiduciary duty even though section 10(b) liability could not be established
because reliance was not established). For the advantages and disadvantages of state
securities law and common law claims, see generally STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 303-11.
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the actor uses the confidential information to purchase or sell
securities-thus bringing the fraud within the ambit of section 10(b).75
Going further, the Supreme Court addressed in detail the
arguments raised by the Fourth Circuit in reliance on Chiarella,
Dirks, and Central Bank of Denver. First, the Court noted that
Chiarella expressly left open the question of the validity of the
misappropriation theory,76 as did the Dirks decision, where the source

of the information had no expectation that it would be kept in
confidence." Lastly, Central Bank likewise did not foreclose the
misappropriation theory, since the language of that case focused on

the scope of liability in section 10(b) private actions for secondary
actors.7" Although rejecting the imposition of aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b), the Central Bank Court also made clear
that secondary actors may be held primarily liable under that

statute. 79 At no point in its decision did the Central Bank Court opine
that section 10(b) encompasses only that deceptive conduct on which
market participants rely. Hence, the misappropriation of confidential,

material information in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information was held by the O'Hagan Court to come within the ambit
of section 10(b).80 This explicit Supreme Court adoption of the
misappropriation theory to resolve the split of authority among the
federal circuits thus overruled Bryan.8
The second of these two cases, SEC v. Zandford, 2 turned on

section 10(b)'s "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security
requirement.83 This case involved an action brought by the SEC
against Charles Zandford, a securities broker, following his conviction
75. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 655-56.
76. Id. at 650 n.4, 661. The Chiarella Court did not address this issue because it had
not been presented to the jury in that case. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
235-36 (1980).
77. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 663; see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
78. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 172-92 (1994).
79. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664. To establish liability for secondary actors, however,
plaintiffs must satisfy all of the elements of a federal securities fraud violation just as for a
primary actor, since liability under these provisions does not extend to aiding and abetting.
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008) (stating that "[t]he conduct of a secondary
actor must satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for liability").
80. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 54, § 5.4
(discussing O'Haganand lower court cases applying the misappropriation theory).
81. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650; see supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text
(discussing Bryan).
82. 238 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
83. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 563.
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on thirteen counts of wire fraud for misappropriating $343,000 of
funds from two of his clients for his own use.' The clients, William
Wood and his daughter, Diane Wood Okstulski, s5 opened a joint
investment account with Zandford in which they placed over
$400,000.6 Ultimately, the clients were left with nothing.87
With the directive to invest the funds conservatively, the clients
granted Zandford discretion to manage the account and power of
attorney to buy and sell securities without their prior approval. 8
Unbeknownst to his clients, Zandford systematically generated
money in the account by selling shares of mutual funds, and he then
withdrew the proceeds for his own use by wire transfer and by checks
drawn on the account payable to Zandford himself.89 In an SEC
enforcement action based on this misconduct, the district court
granted summary judgment to the Commission on counts alleging
violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act,9" section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5. 91
84. Id. at 561. Zandford was ultimately sentenced to fifty-two months in prison and
ordered to pay restitution after his conviction was affirmed in United States v. Zandford,
110 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1997). Id.
85. At this time, Wood was elderly and in poor health, and Okstulski suffered from
both mental disability and a multiple personality disorder. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 561. The
SEC complaint showed that the investment goals for the account were "safety of principal
and income." Zandford, 535 U.S. at 815.
86. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 561.
87. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 815. Wood died shortly thereafter in 1991. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 815-16. A routine examination by the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") initially uncovered Zandford's misappropriation of the funds. Id. at
815. The NASD was originally a self-regulatory body responsible for, among other things,
overseeing the operation of broker-dealers, and the administration of licensing
accreditations such as the Series 7 examination. In 2007, the NASD merged with the
enforcement agency of the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Regulation, Inc., to form
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, also known as FINRA. See generally William
B. Little, Fairness is in the Eyes of the Beholder, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 73, 131-35 (2008)
(discussing the logistical challenges behind the merger). General information about
FINRA may also be found at its website. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
http://www.finra.org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006). This provision forbids, in the offer or sale of any security:
(1) "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"; (2) any material misrepresentation or
half-truth used to obtain money or property; and (3) "any transaction, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." Id.
Unlike under section 10(b), the courts overwhelmingly have held that there is no private
right of action under section 17(a). See, e.g., Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir.
1990); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1102-07 (4th Cir. 1988); Landry v. All Am.
Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389-91 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the provision is
exclusively a tool for SEC civil enforcement actions and federal criminal prosecutions. See,
e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 771-76 (1979). Further, under sections
17(a)(2) and (a)(3), scienter is not a required element and, thus, a showing of negligence is
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The Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that Zandford's conduct was
"not sufficiently connected to a securities transaction to merit
liability" under these provisions.' Drawing on Second Circuit
precedent, the Fourth Circuit held that a fraud must be "integral to
the plaintiff's purchase or sale of the security,"'93 while in this case,
Zandford's sales of the Woods' securities were only "incidental" to

his fraudulent scheme.94 According to the court, the heart of the fraud
instead consisted of absconding with the funds, and the sales of shares

were simply conducted in "a routine and customary fashion."95 In this
analysis, the only connection to the purchase or sale of a security was

that the funds happened to be "converted from a securities
investment account,"96 and the scheme itself more accurately
resembled a state law tort of conversion.9 7
Narrowly interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan

to apply only in cases where the misappropriated confidential
information had "independent value,"98 the Fourth Circuit
determined that O'Hagan did not apply in this context.99 Here, the

court of appeals relied on the discussion in O'Hagan that one aspect
of liability under the misappropriation theory lay in the particularized
nature of information about the subject security-particularized
sufficient to establish a violation in SEC enforcement actions. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 696-97 (1980). For further discussion, see generally Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163 (1979).
91. Zandford,238 F.3d at 561-62.
92. Id. at 566.
93. Id. at 564 (quoting Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., 947 F.2d 595, 598 (2d
Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (citing Hunt v. Robinson, 852 F.2d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 1988)) (holding that fraud
was only incidentally related to the purchase or sale of securities where the defendant
fraudulently refused to convey shares due under an employment contract).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 566 (quoting Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66, 70 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). In
Smith v. Chicago Corp., an account executive similarly withdrew funds from two
customers' securities accounts for his own use, after assuring the customers that he would
follow their instructions to purchase certain securities. Smith v. Chicago Corp., 566 F.
Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Significantly, however, the account executive did not
liquidate any shares to generate the stolen funds, and he only withdrew cash that the
customers had placed in the accounts for the purpose of purchasing securities. Id. Thus,
this fraud never implicated the actual purchase or sale of a security. Id. at 70.
97. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 566 (reasoning that the proceeds "might as well have come
from the unlawful sale of a car which the Woods had entrusted to Zandford's care").
98. Id. at 565.
99. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court disagreed with this narrow interpretation. SEC
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818 (2002). The Court nonetheless stated that, even as
construed by the Fourth Circuit, "the Woods' securities did not have value for [Zandford]
apart from their use in a securities transaction." Id. at 824-25; see infra text accompanying
note 108.
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information that, unlike money, had no real value outside of the

context of a purchase or sale of such security.'0° In particular, the
court of appeals cited the hypothetical noted by the O'Hagan Court
that the misappropriation theory would not apply where a defendant

defrauded a bank or embezzled money from a third party and
thereafter used the proceeds to purchase securities. 101 Because the

Fourth Circuit viewed Zandford's scheme as simply the reverse of this
hypothetical, it reasoned that the securities anti-fraud provisions did
not apply. Echoing the tenor of its earlier decision in Bryan, the court
of appeals declined "to stretch the language of [these] provisions to
encompass every conversion or theft that happens to involve
securities."" °
Once again, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
disagreed with and reversed the holding that neither section 10(b) nor
O'Hagan was to be read in such a limited fashion.

3

Instead,

observing that the fundamental objectives of the federal securities
laws are to effectuate full disclosure and to ensure a higher level of
ethics in the securities industry, the Court held that the anti-fraud

language of section 10(b) should be "construed not technically and°4
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."'
Consistent with these objectives, the SEC's "broad" reading of
section 10(b)'s "in connection with" clause to encompass the conduct
of a broker who accepts payment for securities with no intent to
deliver them, or who liquidates customer securities intending to
misappropriate the proceeds, was reasonable and entitled to judicial
deference."°5 Under this approach, the very mechanics of the plot
100. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 565.
101. Id.; see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1997) (noting that
because of the fungible nature of cash, which "can buy, if not anything, then at least many
things," the purchase of securities with misappropriated funds is "sufficiently detached"
from the misappropriation itself to place the transaction beyond the reach of section 10(b)
liability).
102. Zandford, 238 F.3d at 566.
103. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 813, 819, 824.
104. Id. at 819 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001)). Mead, like
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), governs the
level of deference that courts accord to statutory interpretations made by administrative
agencies such as the SEC. The Chevron standard, under which a court will not review an
administrative interpretation that is reasonable, is appropriate where Congress has
explicitly or implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843-44; see Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services., 545 U.S. 967,
982-83 (2005) (stating that where an ambiguous statute is delegated to an administrative
agency for enforcement, such agency's construction is entitled to judicial deference under
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illustrate the direct correlation to a securities transaction: a series of
undisclosed, unauthorized sales of securities intended only to further
the fraud. 10 6 In fact, the fraud, and thus the violation of section 10(b),
is complete once the security is sold; the subsequent misappropriation
of the proceeds is simply persuasive evidence of intent and not an

independent element of the offense. 107

This focus on the connection between intent and sale, rather than
on the proceeds of the sale, adhered to O'Hagan. The Zandford

Court explicitly stated that, in spite of the bank fraud/embezzlement
hypothetical relied upon by the court of appeals, O'Hagan did not

introduce a new requirement that the subject of a fraud have
"independent value" to the perpetrator outside of a securities
transaction, but even if it did, such an element would be satisfied here
because the subject of the fraud-the securities, not the proceedshad no value to either the Woods or Zandford apart from their use in

a securities transaction.108
Bryan and Zandford thus display a more narrow view of the

securities fraud provisions than the Supreme Court was willing to
embrace, yet both cases were obviously influential in developing the

scope of these statutes. Consistently, in the context of private actions,
the Fourth Circuit likewise has narrowed the "strike zone" for
plaintiffs in important respects, as a review of several cases from the
survey period will show.

Chevron, even when the courts previously have interpreted the subject statute differently
from such agency). Where such express authority is lacking, however, deference may still
be appropriate for certain statutory interpretations. Under the lesser Mead standard, the
courts must afford lesser deference to an agency interpretation based on "the 'specialized
experience and broader investigations and information' available to the agency, and given
the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national
law requires." Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139
(1944)); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (stating that well-reasoned views
of subject agency implementing a statute provide proper guidance for courts). See
generally Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921 (2006) (arguing
that the Chevron doctrine is necessary to give effect to vague and generalized statutory
provisions).
106. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 824-25.
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IV. A VIEW OF THE NARROW "STRIKE ZONE" FROM THE MOUND: 10 9
SELECTED CASES FROM THE SURVEY PERIOD

Drawing on the foundation of the cases discussed above,
particularly Raab and Hillson Partners,"' several cases from the
survey period provide a flavor for the Fourth Circuit's continuing
approach to aspects of the elements of securities fraud claims such as

materiality, scienter, and causation. Notably, significant developments
occurred during this time frame, including congressional enactment of
the PSLRA and Supreme Court decisions in prominent cases such as
Stoneridge Investment Partners,L. L. C. v. Scientific-Atlanta. Inc."' and
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd."2 The following

discussion focuses on Fourth Circuit interpretations that, while
anticipating these developments, further confined the parameters of
the already narrow "strike zone."
A.

Materiality
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only provide liability for material

misstatements, half-truths, or omissions.'13 Thus, to establish a claim,
a securities fraud plaintiff must not only demonstrate a disclosure
deficiency, but he must also show that such lack of accurate disclosure
is objectively material. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the
term "material" signifies that a reasonable investor would consider
the information important when making an investment (or voting)
decision, or stated somewhat differently, that a substantial likelihood
exists that accurate disclosure of the subject information would alter
the total mix of information available at the time." 4 Because this
determination must take into account many different factors as well
as their relative significance, it is normally a question of fact for a
jury."5 Nonetheless, when materiality or lack thereof is "so obvious
that reasonable minds [could] not differ," the issue may be decided as

109. The pitching mound, where the pitcher's plate or "pitching rubber" is located, is a
circle eighteen feet in diameter, with its center placed fifty-nine feet from the back of
home plate. PLAYING RULES COMM., supra note 1, at 1-3. The mound area rises in a
gradual slope from the edges of the circle to a height that places the pitcher's plate ten
inches above the level of home plate. Id.; see supra note 2.
110. See supra notes 22-51 and accompanying text.
111. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
112. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
113. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
114. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1998); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see supra note 43.
115. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
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a matter of law.' 16 This standard accordingly provides courts with a
measure of discretion toward the assessment of materiality, and it is
perhaps one reason for the varying "strike zone" among the circuit
courts for securities claims based on how stringently the standard is
applied.
1. Greenhouse v. MCG CapitalCorp.
Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp."7 provides some insight into
the Fourth Circuit's treatment of materiality."' In this case,
shareholders instituted a section 10(b) claim (as well as a claim under
section 11 of the Securities Act" 9 ) after the company's CEO, Bryan
Mitchell, revealed that he had lied about receiving an undergraduate
degree in economics from Syracuse University, and he had allowed
the company to include this misrepresentation in filings with the
SEC. 2 ° The district court dismissed the complaint on the finding that
Mitchell's educational background was immaterial as a matter of law,
and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, apparently approving of the district
court's conclusion that a plaintiff "cannot use the credibility and
integrity problems that result from a false statement to bootstrap an
otherwise immaterial false statement into creating a basis for a
securities fraud action."''
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of materiality focused on the bare
fact of Mitchell's educational background, standing alone, to conclude
that his failure to obtain a degree did not alter the "total mix" of
information available to investors.'22 This holding was based on the
relative strength of other information about the company's leadership
provided in public statements and filings, such as Mitchell's years of
116. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1489 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting TSC Indus., 426
U.S. at 450) (alteration in original).
117. 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 658.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). Section 11 provides a private right of action for damages
on behalf of purchasers who acquired their securities pursuant to a Securities Act
registration statement that contains a materially false or misleading statement. Id. Parties
subject to liability under section 11 include the issuer, directors, signatories of the
registration statement, underwriters, and certain experts, such as accountants and
engineers. Id. A due diligence defense may be invoked by the subject parties, except by
the issuer. Id.; see, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir.
1994); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 656-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 652, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For
further discussion, see STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 205-26.
120. Greenhouse, 392 F.3d at 653-54. In fact, Mitchell did attend Syracuse University,
where he studied economics, but left before obtaining a degree. Id.
121. Id. at 655.
122. Id. at 658-59.
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successful experience and the similar track records of other members
of the board of directors and management. 23 This "large body of
information" outweighed the value of "what Mitchell did (or, as the
case may be, did not do) during what would have been his fourth year
at Syracuse."124 Importantly, this finding excluded any careful
assessment of the misrepresentation on the overall credibility of the
company or its management. Since any knowingly false statement
implicates the integrity of management to some extent, the court
reasoned that consideration of these factors would "simply [read]
materiality out of the statute" and could render all misrepresentations
by senior management actionable, no matter how trivial. 25
Few published cases involving misrepresentation of executive
academic credentials existed at the time of the Greenhouse
decision,'26 but similar high-profile incidents in the years following
demonstrate that corporate stakeholders and investors often view
such matters as anything but trivial, and for very good reason. In
2006, the CEO of RadioShack, David J. Edmondson, was ultimately
forced to resign after he revealed that he had lied about receiving two
college degrees. 127 Significantly, RadioShack stock dropped twelve

percent in the week that investors received this news. 128 Only a year
123. Id. at 658.
124. Id. The court also pointed to quantitative (as compared to qualitative) factors,
including "the years of MCG's earnings statements as a private company; the firm's
debt/equity ratio; the general costs of capital and macroeconomic trends; the strength of
MCG's potential competitors; etc." Id.
125. Id. at 660. The court listed misrepresentations by a CEO about his/her marital
fidelity and golf handicap as possible examples. Id.
126. Id. at 657. See SEC v. Physicians Guardian Unit Inv. Trust, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1342,
1344-51 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that a complaint alleging, among other violations,
misrepresentation that principal held a law degree from Boston University School of Law
adequately plead elements of federal securities fraud to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss); New Equity Sec. Holders Comm. for Golden Gulf, Ltd. v. Phillips, 97 B.R. 492,
496-97 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (finding misrepresentation in offering memorandum that
principal had a college degree in business administration from the University of Arkansas
was not material); SEC v. Suter, No. 81 C 3865, 1983 WL 1287, at *3, 19-21 (N.D. 11. 1983)
(granting injunction after a hearing where the court determined as a finding of fact that
defendants, among other violations, misrepresented that their investment adviser held a
Masters in Business Administration from DePaul University).
127. Floyd Norris, RadioShack Chief Resigns After Lying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at
C1.
128. Id. In its 2004 annual filing with the SEC, in which it announced Edmondson's
imminent appointment as CEO, RadioShack made no disclosure of Edmondson's
educational background. See RadioShack Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Mar.
16, 2005). In a press release following the announcement of Edmondson's resignation,
RadioShack stated that the board of directors was aware of "some, but definitely not all"
of the issues surrounding its former CEO's resume. RadioShack Corp., Current Report
(Form 8-K), at Exhibit 99.1 (Feb. 21, 2006).
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later, Patrick Imbardelli, the chief executive of InterContinental
Hotels Group's Asia Pacific region, was ousted when an investigation
ahead of his appointment to the board of directors uncovered that
none of the three degrees he claimed to hold were in fact valid. 129 A
spokesman for the company noted that even Imbardelli's proven
record of professional accomplishments could not overcome the
impact of this deceit: "With something like this, the fundamental basis
of trust is undermined." 3 ' Certainly such concerns extend outside the
'
Notably,
traditional corporate world, even to the "gridiron."131
George O'Leary was forced to resign his position as head coach of the
Notre Dame football team less than one week after being hired, after
it came to light that his claims that he held a master's degree and that
he had lettered in three years of college football at the University of
New Hampshire were false. 32 Notre Dame athletic director Kevin
White said of the decision: "I understand that these inaccuracies
represent a very human failing; nonetheless, they constitute a breach
of trust that makes it impossible for us to go forward with our
' 33
relationship.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Greenhouse thus minimizes the
significance of qualitative materiality, a concept that has enjoyed
long-standing judicial acceptance. 34 As the SEC stated nearly a half-

129. Dominic Walsh, Hotels Boss Quits Over Fake Qualifications,TIMES (London),
June 15, 2007, at 59.
130. Id.
131. The term "gridiron" to describe American football apparently arose from the
resemblance of the pattern of hash marks on the playing field to "gridiron" grills used to
cook meat or fish over open flames, and the term was first used in print in 1897 in a story
in the Boston Herald. MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND PHRASE ORIGINS 261
(William & Mary Morris eds., Harper & Row 1971) (1962). For a discussion of the
emergence of "gridiron" football from the sports that would eventually become soccer and
rugby, see WANGERIN, supra note 3, at 19-23.
132. Andrew Bagnato, Hasty Hire White's Undoing, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2001, at N1.
For a detailed history of O'Leary's career and the events leading up to his resignation
from Notre Dame, see Gary Smith, Lying In Wait: As George O'Leary Climbed the
Coaching Ladder to His Dream Job at Notre Dame, a Dirty Secret Was Lurking in His
Resume. But Did He Pay Too High a Price for a Few Lies?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr.
8, 2002, at 70-89.
133. Bagnato, supra note 132. Significantly, whether O'Leary had lettered in football
or obtained a master's degree had not been an issue in Notre Dame's decision to hire him
as head coach, but his falsifying of academic credentials was considered "a death knell."
Smith, supra note 132, at 87.
134. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1979); Bertoglio v.
Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 644-55 (D. Del. 1980); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978); cf Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154,
162-65 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying qualitative economic materiality and rejecting the
exclusive use of numerical benchmarks to assess materiality); infra note 175.
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century ago, "[e]valuation of the quality of management-to
whatever extent it is possible-is an essential ingredient of informed
investment decision[s]. 135 Expanding on this concept, the
Commission by rule requires affirmative disclosure of certain
qualitative information in SEC filings made by publicly-held
companies, including management's business experience. 3 6 Here,

although the specific information disclosed is not called for by SEC
rule,'37 publicly-held companies frequently provide the educational
background of the CEO and other high-level corporate officers.138

This prevalent practice points to the information's relevance to the
investing public. To hold that a CEO's outright lie regarding his

educational credentials is not material as a matter of law contravenes
accepted norms of corporate governance. 13 9

In addition to such obvious concerns over credibility, there is an
increasing realization that cases like these indicate a fundamental
weakness in corporate controls and screening processes that could
create exposure to regulatory actions and other legal claims such as
135. In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 170 (1964); see Ralph C. Ferrara, Richard M.
Starr, & Marc I. Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity
and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 555, 555 (1981) (discussing qualitatively material
information that "reflects on the quality of corporate management").
136. Directors, Executive Officers, Promoters and Control Persons, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.401(e)(1) (2009) ("Briefly describe the business experience during the past five years
of each director, executive officer, person nominated or chosen to become a director or
executive officer, and each person named in answer to paragraph (c) of Item 401,
including: each person's principal occupations and employment during the past five years;
the name and principal business of any corporation or other organization in which such
occupations and employment were carried on; and whether such corporation or
organization is a parent, subsidiary or other affiliate of the registrant."); see MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 1.09 (2009).
137. Item 401(e) contains a five-year look-back period. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e)(1). Since
Mitchell's biographical information was contained in a prospectus issued in 2001, the
required look-back period began in 1997, although MCG included disclosure of Mitchell's
professional history back to 1988. See Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650,
653-54 (4th Cir. 2004).
138. See, e.g., Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 97 (Feb. 13, 2009); Acura
Pharm., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 45 (Mar. 2, 2009); Dell, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 9-11 (Mar. 31, 2008).
139. See COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, AM. BAR ASS'N., CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S
GUIDEBOOK 30 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that in the disclosure process a subject corporation
should have procedures that "are reasonably designed to produce accurate and complete
public disclosures" and that "[m]any public companies have established internal disclosure
committees composed of managers who have specific responsibility for the company's
SEC filings and other public financial disclosures"). See generally Cheryl L. Wade,
Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine Its Benefits?, 39 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 595, 608-10 (2008) (discussing a principles-based compliance regime for
disclosure that promotes substance over form, rather than "simply checking off items on
an articulated checklist").
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negligent hiring and retention. 14 Taken together, these issues
certainly cast doubt on the relative ease with which the Fourth Circuit
discounted the materiality of the deliberate falsehood made in
Greenhouse.
2. Longman v. Food Lion, Inc.
Longman v. Food Lion, Inc.14 1 illustrates the Fourth Circuit's
approach to materiality of alleged misrepresentations as well as
omitted facts in securities actions.1 42 Here, the court of appeals held
that the subject corporation's alleged failure to disclose violations of
federal labor laws and a pattern of unsanitary food handling practices
were not material. The court reasoned that the labor violations were
already publicly known and that the level of unsanitary food practices
was not of sufficient magnitude to affect the price of Food Lion's
43
stock.
In Food Lion, shareholders brought a class action suit shortly
after a televised investigative report about Food Lion that
precipitated a sharp decline in the company's stock.144 The report
detailed supposedly widespread labor and sanitation abuses in Food
Lion stores. 45 The plaintiffs claimed that the company's failure to
46
disclose these practices inflated stock prices during the class period.
During the class period, Food Lion became the target of a
boycott by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
("UFCW") that stemmed from the company's resistance to efforts to
unionize its workers. 147 The UFCW eventually filed a formal
complaint with the Department of Labor that alleged a widespread
pattern of labor abuses because of Food Lion's tacit encouragement
of off-the-clock work hours.1 48 This filing sparked a series of dueling
press releases from the UFCW and Food Lion, with accusations on
one side that over one-third of the grocery chain's profits derived

140. Susan Gardner et al., Does Your Background Checker Put You in Jeopardy? A
Case for Best Practices and Due Diligence, 11 J. LEGAL, ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 111,

114-16 (2008).
141. 197 F.3d 675 (4th Cir.1999).
142. Id. at 675-88.
143. Id. at 684-86.

144. Id. at 677.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 684-86. The class period covered a roughly three-year period from the date
that Food Lion filed its 1989 annual report until the date of the television report. Id.
147. Id. at 678.
148. Id. at 678-79.
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from illegal labor'4 9 and heated denials by the company on the
other."' Food Lion announced that it would conduct a full

investigation of the allegations contained in the federal labor
complaint, but it simultaneously asserted that these claims constituted
no more than a pattern of harassment by the union. 5 ' The company's
annual reports during this time did not acknowledge any prevalent
labor or sanitation problems in Food Lion stores, 52 and its 1991
report issued in June 1992 stated that it "believ[ed] that Food Lion's
Extra Low Prices and its clean and conveniently located stores are
' A form 10especially well suited to the demands of our customers." 153
Q filed with the SEC in July 1992 confirmed that an investigation of

the labor charges was ongoing, but that in the opinion of the
company, it had "meritorious defenses to the allegations[, that Food
Lion] intend[ed] to defend the allegations vigorously and any liability
[would] not have a material adverse effect"' 54 on its financial results

or operations.'55
Then, on November 5, 1992, American
("ABC") televised an edition of PrimeTime
violations of labor laws and food sanitation
stores that featured interviews with current

Broadcasting Company
Live with an expos6 on
standards at Food Lion
and former Food Lion

employees as well as hidden-camera footage that focused on three of
Food Lion's stores.'56 Several employees gave harrowing accounts of
149. Id. The UFCW press release claimed that Food Lion might owe almost $200
million in back wages because of unpaid hours, and it further asserted that the grocery
chain's liability for these violations could be "as high as $388 million." Id. at 679.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 679-80.
153. Id. at 679. A similar statement appeared in Food Lion's 1989 annual report: "[W]e
will continue to pay close attention to service levels and cleanliness in our stores and
believe we will achieve high marks from customers in these areas." Id. at 678.
154. Id. at 680. Several months after the close of the class period, Food Lion eventually
entered into a settlement agreement with the Department of Labor concerning these
allegations and other charges that the company routinely violated child labor laws by
allowing or encouraging minors to operate meat-cutting and paper-box bailing devices. Id.
Under the terms of the settlement, Food Lion admitted no wrongdoing, but it agreed to
pay amounts representing back wages and penalties of $16.2 million. Id. These charges
amounted to a cost to shareholders of approximately two cents per share, which experts
from both the plaintiffs and defendants in the case agreed was not material to earnings. Id.
at 685.
155. Id. at 680.
156. Id. These investigative techniques, which included ABC journalists obtaining
employment at Food Lion stores to obtain access and opportunities to film secretly, led to
a lawsuit by Food Lion against ABC, alleging trespass and fraud that involved serious
questions about journalistic ethics and the extent of First Amendment protections. Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1999). For more
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various unsanitary food practices that allowed the grocery chain to
sell out-of-date or even spoiled food,'57 and many claimed that
employees were required to work extra hours off the clock because of
Food Lion's scheduling system and overtime policies.'5 8 In addition to
employee interviews, ABC's hidden camera video captured some of
this conduct directly on film. 5 9 Shareholders soon filed suit when
Food Lion's stock price dropped sharply on the day after the
broadcast.' 6
The Fourth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for
Food Lion.' As to the alleged labor violations, the court held that
because information about the practices described in the television
broadcast was already publicly available,'162 disclosure of such
practices on PrimeTime Live was not material to Food Lion's
earnings or its stock price. 63 Even though the company publicly
denied the allegations, the court placed significant weight on Food
Lion's statement that it would conduct an investigation to conclude
whether "[tihe market had a full opportunity to evaluate these claims
and to reflect their risk in the market price for Food Lion stock. '' 6" In
discussion on the outcome of this case and of conflicts between journalistic freedoms and
possible tortious conduct by news gatherers, see James A. Albert, The Liability of the
Press for Trespass and Invasion of Privacy in Gathering the News-A Call for the
Recognition of a Newsgathering Tort Privilege,45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 331, 333-39 (2002).
157. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 680. These practices included altering expiration dates to
extend shelf life, bleaching meat and fish to remove odor, and mixing rotten pork with
fresh pork to sell as fresh sausage. Id.
158. Id. at 678. The report alleged that while Food Lion offered wages and benefits
superior to competitors, its time management policy, called Effective Scheduling, forced
workers in practice to work extra, uncompensated hours to complete scheduled tasks, or
they risked losing their jobs. Id.
159. Id. at 680.
160. Id. at 680-81 (stating that "[t]he day after the broadcast, Food Lion's Class A
stock fell from $9.25 per share to $8.25 per share, and its Class B stock fell from $10.00 per
share to $8.625 per share").
161. Id. at 677.
162. Id. at 684. Here the court relied on Hillson Partnersfor the proposition that the
securities laws do not require disclosure of information that is "already in the public
domain." Id. In that case, however, the information at issue-the ongoing financial
difficulties of a subsidiary-had been disclosed by the issuer in annual reports and SEC
filings, and its veracity was not disputed by any party. See Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v.
Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1994).
163. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 685.
164. Id. Notably, the court here relied on Raab for the proposition that the market has
internalized all publicly available information. See Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,
289 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing that such a presumption is encompassed in the fraud-onthe-market theory of reliance). See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47
(1988) (approving the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to create a rebuttable
presumption of reliance in section 10(b) class actions for securities traded on an efficient
market).
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the view of the court, the television program added no new
information to inform the market but instead only repeated earlier
accusations through the experiences of individual employees. 6 5 The
court pointed to the small effect on earnings per share of the
company's eventual settlement of its labor claims with the
Department of Justice to support the conclusion that this information
was not material, as well as the fact that the price of Food Lion's
stock did not drop following announcement of the settlement. 66
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit opined that the "day-to-day"
conditions of Food Lion's stores and the "existence of various
sanitation problems that were revealed from time to time" were not
material to the price of the company's stock, and it further noted that
the statements the company made about the cleanliness of its stores in
its annual reports were not sufficient to support reliance.167 The court
ruled that, even considering the contents of the PrimeTime Live
broadcast, 168 the plaintiffs had not shown that there were widespread
problems with sanitation, or further, that Food Lion was aware of
these conditions. 169 The court of appeals agreed with the reasoning of
the district court that because the investigative report focused on only
three of Food Lion's 1,000 stores and interviewed a total of seventy
former and current employees, the conditions that it depicted did not
indicate a sufficiently pervasive problem to be material. 7 Finally, the
statements made about the cleanliness of Food Lion's stores in the
company's annual reports were found to be no more than soft, puffing
statements upon which investors were not entitled to rely.171

165. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 685.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 686; see Raab, 4 F.3d at 289 & n.1 (discussing "commonplace commercial
puffery").
168. Food Lion, 197 F. 3d at 685. The court of appeals, like the district court, noted
that most of the PrimeTime Live broadcast was inadmissible hearsay, as none of the
persons who spoke were under oath or subject to cross-examination. Id. The Federal
Rules of Evidence exclude prior statements from witnesses who are unavailable to testify
at trial from the general prohibition on hearsay in certain limited circumstances, but
presumably none of those exceptions applied in this case. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
169. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 686.
170. Id.
171. Id. With respect to the concept of puffery, see Raab, 4 F.3d at 289-90; Jennifer
O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery
Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1699 (1998) (asserting

that "the courts have significantly expanded the scope of a powerful defense to dismiss
potentially meritorious securities fraud actions").
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As the dissent in Food Lion noted, the majority relied heavily on
both Hillson Partners and Raab to analyze materiality, 17 2 and thus,
this case illustrates the effect of these two cases to help define the
"strike zone" plaintiffs in securities cases in the Fourth Circuit must
face. The dissent was also likely correct, however, that Hillson
Partners and Raab should not have governed here, because the
majority overlooked the requirement of Basic that the source of
market information be credible to affect a materiality analysis.173
Here, the market only had access to information about Food Lion's
labor problems from a source that was admittedly antagonistic to the
company, and only in the form of allegations that the company
strongly denied. Under this analysis, the PrimeTime Live expos6 did
in fact inject new, material information into the marketplace by
providing independent corroboration of the already-known, but hotly
disputed, allegations. The observation of the court that no stock drop
occurred after the announcement that Food Lion had settled the
allegations with the Department of Labor also supports, rather than
undercuts, this conclusion; because the market had already
assimilated the effect of the allegations following the television
broadcast, no further adjustment necessarily would be expected. As
the dissent asserted, an issue of fact regarding the materiality of Food
Lion's omissions and representations existed that should have
precluded the grant of summary judgment.174
Although the dissent considered only the labor violations, this
same argument applies with similar force to the materiality of
unsanitary conditions in Food Lion stores. Here, again, the majority
declined to adequately address how a reasonable investor would view
the allegations in the PrimeTime Live expos6 and their effect on the
total mix of information available. Rather, the court largely engaged
in a premature quantitative analysis based on the number of stores
and employees featured in the investigative report. A proper analysis
of materiality under Basic, however, does not rest solely upon
172. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 687 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 22-51 and
accompanying text (discussing Hillson Partnersand Raab).
173. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 687 (citing Raab, 4 F.3d at 289) (quoting In re Apple Sec.
Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989)). "The investing public justifiably places heavy
reliance on the statements and opinions of corporate insiders. In order to avoid [federal
securities fraud] liability, any material information which insiders fail to disclose must be
transmitted to the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively
counter-balance any misleading impression created by the insider's one-sided
representations." In re Apple Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d at 1116 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988)).
174. Food Lion, 197 F.3d at 687-88.
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quantitative factors but also upon the qualitative force5 of the
17
information from the point of view of a reasonable investor.
Pursuant to a qualitative economic approach, investigative
techniques utilized by a reputable source evidencing that tainted food
was sold to the consuming public smacks of impropriety. To opine
that such allegations as a matter of law are immaterial cannot be
reconciled with the public concern for sanitary food practices. Indeed,
the recent scandals involving outbreaks of salmonella resulting from

17 6
unsanitary food practices by manufacturers highlight this concern.
Notably, the ability of the food service industry to police itself has
been called into serious doubt in congressional hearings on these
outbreaks: for example, federal inspectors sent to examine two
peanut processing plants that were a source of salmonella

contamination found dead mice and roaches, mold in the ceilings and

walls, and rain water dripping into food processing areas-even
though a previous inspector hired by one of the plants had reported
no rodent problems and had given the facility a "superior" rating for
its processing functions.177 Hence, the potential adverse economic

impact upon the price of the subject company's stock price due to
such unsafe conditions is clear. Accordingly, given the nature of the
175. See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utilities. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162-65 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that qualitative factors can render relatively small quantitative changes in revenue
material); see also SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin ("SAB") No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150,
45,152 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). SAB 99 sets forth a non-exhaustive
list of qualitative factors that affect the materiality of quantitative measures, including the
inherent precision or imprecision of the measurement and whether a misstatement masks
other changes or trends, or conceals a failure to meet analyst expectations. SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, supra. SEC SABs do not carry the force of law as do rules
promulgated by the Commission pursuant to its rulemaking authority, but courts
nonetheless consider SABs to be persuasive authority and afford a level of deference to
these administrative provisions. Ganino, 228 F.3d at 163-64 (citing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). See generally Paul A. Dame, Stare Decicis, Chevron, and
Skidmore: Do Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 405 (2003) (discussing the levels of deference afforded to administrative
interpretations and the role of administrative expertise in the judicial framework); supra
note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the Mead and Chevron standards for
deference to administrative interpretations).
176. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Andrew Martin, House Panel Questions Industry on
Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,2009, at A18.
177. The Salmonella Outbreak: The Role of Industry in Protecting the Nation's Food
Supply: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 1-3 (2009) (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations). Representative Stupak
highlights the fact that the previous auditor, employed by a private firm selected and paid
by the company who owned the plant, gave advance notice of the audit in an email to the
plant manager with the words " '[y]ou lucky guy. I am your... auditor. So we need to get
your plant set up for any audit.' "Id. at 2.
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allegations and the direct documentary evidence of Food Lion's
allegedly unsanitary food practices, it may be concluded that
reasonable minds would differ about their importance to investors,
thereby precluding a grant of summary judgment.
Taken together, Greenhouse and Food Lion display a
particularly narrow view of materiality that some assert is justified as
an exercise of the court's duty to "screen out" meritless claims and
promote judicial economy.178 While one may question the particular
analytical steps employed to determine materiality in these two cases,
these processes demonstrate the nature of difficulties that securities
plaintiffs have faced in bringing claims in the Fourth Circuit over the
past several years.
B.

Scienter

Along with the requirement of materiality, section 10(b) also
demands a showing that the defendant acted with a specified level of
scienter, meaning with "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
' As the following cases illustrate, over time
manipulate, or defraud."1 79
this standard has come to embrace not just willful conduct but, in
certain contexts, recklessness as well. 8 In addition to the recognition
178. See, e.g., Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 220 (4th Cir.
1994) (opining that the high bar required to adequately plead and establish the elements
of federal securities fraud are appropriate to prevent a proliferation of securities
litigation); Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); see also R.
Gregory Roussel, Note, Securities Fraud or Mere Puffery: Refinement of the Corporate
Puffery Defense, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1084 (1998) (discussing immateriality of
"corporate puffery" statements and asserting that according judicial protection to such
statements is "a useful way to effectively, yet fairly, screen investor strike suits").
Arguably, another example of the Fourth Circuit's "narrow strike zone" is Phillips v. LCI
International,Inc., 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999). There, the court of appeals held that the
CEO's statement that the company was "not for sale" when preliminary negotiations had
allegedly already commenced was not material in light of the totality of information
available to investors at the time. Id. at 615-20; see infra note 196. Phillipshas been viewed
as a restrictive application of the Supreme Court's probability/magnitude test of
materiality set forth in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). See, e.g.,
STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 338 n.19; see also infra text accompanying notes 183-204
(discussing Phillips in connection with the element of scienter).
179. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)). See generally STEINBERG, supra
note 4, at 251-54 (discussing requisite level of intent and pleading requirements).
180. See, e.g., Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir.
2003). As Ottman illustrates, however, instances of conduct that depart so extremely from
the ordinary level of care so as to constitute recklessness are relatively rare. See id. But see
In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a
jury could reasonably find that the partnership's equal basis statements constituted
"recklessness"). Further, under the PSLRA, forward-looking statements receive extended
protection: when accompanied by meaningful, cautionary "safe harbor" language, state of
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of recklessness as a basis for scienter, two other significant events
helped to define the contours of this element during the survey
period-the passage of the PSLRA in 1995 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Tellabs in 2007. Pursuant to the PSLRA, plaintiffs must
meet a heightened pleading standard with respect to scienter, in that
the facts plead must give rise "to a strong inference that the
' Further, under
defendant acted with the required state of mind."181
the Tellabs standard, this "strong inference" must be both "cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent
intent.' 18 2 The cases below provide some insight into how the Fourth
Circuit has integrated these new standards into its existing body of
case law, which in some instances had already incorporated a
markedly similar approach toward the element of scienter in
securities fraud cases.
1. Phillips v. LCI International,Inc.
In Phillips v. LCI International, Inc.,183 a pre-Tellabs case, the

court of appeals first confronted recklessness as a basis for scienter by
considering the test adopted earlier by the Second Circuit.'14 Here,
the securities fraud claims focused on alleged misstatements made in
the context of the 1998 merger between telecommunications firms

mind becomes wholly irrelevant, and when unaccompanied by such language, the required
level of scienter is actual knowledge that the statements are false or misleading. Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2006)); see, e.g., In re Compuware Sec. Litig., 301
F. Supp. 2d 672, 683 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
181. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109
Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person's mind may be alleged generally.").
182. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314. The Tellabs decision resolved a split of authority among
the circuit courts as to the standard to apply to weigh competing inferences. Id. at 322. For
example, the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuits had adopted more stringent tests that
required the inference of culpable intent to be the most plausible of competing inferences,
while the Seventh Circuit had rejected weighing inferences altogether. See id. at 317-18; In
re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1999) (opining that legislative
history indicated that "Congress intended for the PSLRA to raise the pleading standard
even beyond the most stringent existing standard").
183. 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999).
184. Id. at 620 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir.
1993)). Under the Second Circuit standard, plaintiffs can establish scienter by pleading
facts establishing either: (1) a motive and opportunity to commit fraud; or (2)
circumstantial evidence of recklessness or intentional conduct. Id.
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LCI International ("LCI") and Qwest. 185 The precise statement at
issue was the remark by LCI chief executive H. Brian Thompson that
LCI was "not a company that's for sale," made at a time when
preliminary discussions about a possible 186merger between LCI and
Qwest allegedly had in fact already begun.
Thompson made this statement on February 17, 1998, in the
course of an interview about LCI's just-released quarterly earnings. 87
Less than a month later, however, LCI and Qwest publicly announced
that they would merge, allegedly as the result of discussions that
began in October 1997, when the chief executive officer of Qwest
approached Thompson at a trade convention.18 8 On the basis of this
initial discussion, officers of the two companies began meeting at the
end of October, and they had reached an agreement to begin
reciprocal due diligence by late November.18 9 In December, Qwest
made an offer of thirty-six dollars a share for LCI's stock, but it
received a letter in return from LCI that stated that the company
''was not for sale," but nonetheless indicated that its board of
directors would consider a sale at a price substantially higher than
that proposed. 190
On February 19, 1998, two days after Thompson made his public
remarks during the interview, LCI received another offer from Qwest
for forty dollars a share. 9' After two weeks of due diligence and
negotiations, the companies finally arrived at a price of forty-two
dollars a share, and they announced the deal on March 9.192 The
plaintiffs, LCI shareholders that sold their stock between February 17
and March 9, brought suit roughly a month after the announcement
of the merger.'93

185. Id. at 611-12. During this time period, the telecommunications industry was
undergoing a period of rapid consolidation through a series of mergers and acquisitions
among the leading companies in the field. See Kathy Bergen, Pay-TV Faces Diminishing
Returns-Merger Would Whittle Choices, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2001, at N1 (discussing
consolidation of telecommunications industry following deregulation in 1996); infra note
196.
186. Phillips, 190 F.3d at 612.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 613.
189. Id. at 612.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 612-13. On the day that the deal was made public, Thompson appeared on
CNN Moneyline with Lou Dobbs, where he responded to the question of how long LCI
and Qwest had been discussing a merger: "[tialking to each other? It goes way back, but
really in earnest for the last three or four weeks." Id. at 613.
193. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit first considered the varying approaches to
pleading scienter that the circuit courts had developed in the wake of
the PSLRA, but it ultimately declined to adopt any one standard
since, in its analysis, the plaintiffs had failed to meet even the most
lenient of the competing tests under the PSLRA-that developed by
the Second Circuit. 94 Under that test, scienter could be established by

alleging specific facts to show that either: (1) the defendants had
engaged in conscious or reckless conduct; or (2) the defendants had
both a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud. 19 As to the first
prong, the court held that because the plaintiffs had failed to plead
facts showing that Thompson's statements were materially false, 96 no

strong inference of conscious or reckless behavior could be drawn. 197
Similarly, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim, that Thompson's
personal incentive was to artificially depress the price of LCI stock,
was too speculative to establish "motive and opportunity" under the
alternative prong of the Second Circuit test. 198 The court of appeals

held that allegations that an executive took certain actions to preserve
a corporate position, standing alone, could not establish motive, nor
could a claim that executives were motivated by increased
compensation absent a showing of insider trading or sales of personal
stock. 199 Since the plaintiffs could only demonstrate incentives that
existed in virtually every merger, the court held that the complaint

did not raise the required "strong inference" of scienter.2°°
Here, the court of appeals' analysis likely served the purpose of

the PSLRA to curtail suits based upon weak inferences or attenuated
theories of misconduct. Under the plaintiffs' characterization of the
events of the LCI/Qwest merger, Thompson not only made his public
statements that the company was "not for sale" to depress the price of
194. Id. at 621; see supra note 182.
195. Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620.
196. Id. at 618-20. Because the state of the telecommunications industry was in a
period of rapid consolidation and because the statement was made in the context of a
release discussing almost-record profits and stock price for LCI, the court of appeals
concluded that Thompson's remark could not be considered to have a substantial
likelihood of altering the total mix of information available to a reasonable investor at the
time. Id.; see supra note 43 (discussing the materiality standard).
197. Phillips,190 F.3d at 621.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 622.
200. Id. "To support a claim of motive based on the benefit a defendant derives from
an increase in the value of his holdings, a plaintiff must demonstrate some sale of
'personally-held stock' or 'insider trading' by the defendant." Id. (citing Stevelman v. Alias
Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1999); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm.
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
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LCI's stock to encourage the merger, but he also deployed his own
vote against the merger-on the supposition that Qwest wanted to be
able to announce unanimous board support-as a strategy to exact
more favorable terms from Qwest for himself personally. 2 1 As the
court noted, the suggestion of fraud displayed in this account would
require the court to string together several speculative inferences to
attribute a culpable motive to Thompson's actions.0 2 From that
perspective, Phillips is an apt example of the PSLRA's "strong
inference" requirement appropriately used to balance the competing
interests of issuers and investors in securities fraud actions.0 3
Going further, however, Phillips employed almost precisely the
standard that would be articulated by the Supreme Court in Tellabs
almost ten years later. Clearly the court of appeals did not find the
theory of scienter alleged by the plaintiffs to be cogent, in that it
required multiple inferential steps, nor did it find that the inferences
of fraudulent intent were as plausible on the whole as competing
inferences of non-culpability. In this regard, Phillips serves as another
example of the Fourth Circuit as an "early adopter" of a significant
interpretation of the securities fraud provisions. °4
2. Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc.
In Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc.,2 °5 the court
followed Phillips and explicitly recognized recklessness as a basis to
establish scienter in a securities fraud claim.2 6 The plaintiffs in this
case were investors who brought claims against the company, Hanger
Orthopedic Group, Inc. ("Hanger"), and two of its officers for alleged
oral and written misstatements made during conference calls with
201. Id. at 621-22.
202. Id. at 623.
203. Id. at 620-24. See, e.g., Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm., Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 624 (4th
Cir. 2008) (holding that the PSLRA, in conjunction with Tellabs, balances concerns of
plaintiffs and defendants by screening meritless claims from valid claims early in
litigation); infra text accompanying notes 230-66 (discussing Cozzarelli); see also Rose,
supra note 5, at 1335-37, 1349 (describing the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements
as part of a "narrowing" approach to federal securities litigation reform that balances risks
of dismissing suits with "technical" merit with harms of over-deterrence in domestic
capital markets). But see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 TEX. L. REV.
551, 607-11 (2003) (asserting that the PSLRA heightened pleading standard for scienter is
inherently unworkable and suggesting procedural alternatives, such as limited discovery,
to protect interests of plaintiffs and defendants).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 and 41-61 (discussing the court's
treatment of the materiality of forward-looking statements in advance of the express
protections granted to such statements by the PSLRA).
205. 353 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003).
206. Id. at 344.
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investors and analysts and in press releases discussing quarterly
207
revenues.
In particular, these statements concerned problems Hanger had
encountered following the acquisition of a new subsidiary, NovaCare
Orthotics & Prosthetics ("NovaCare").2 °8 Both Hanger and NovaCare
were providers of orthotic and prosthetic devices to patients with
artificial limbs whose profitability depended on certified practitioners
qualified to fit these devices for their customers.2 9 Following the
acquisition, which occurred during the third quarter of 1999, a
number of NovaCare practitioners decided to leave the company.210
On November 8, 1999, Hanger executives issued a press release with
third quarter earnings and participated in a conference call to discuss
the results.2"' In the conference call, a Hanger executive stated that
"approximately" ten practitioners had left NovaCare before the
acquisition and "about" another ten afterward, for a total loss of $8
million in revenue. 12 Another executive stated that this loss did not
constitute a "major defection"
and that it was "certainly not any kind
213
of a trend that we see.
In a January 7, 2000, conference call, however, a Hanger
executive made statements that indicated that the number of postacquisition practitioner resignations was not ten but rather eighteen
or nineteen, and he further revealed that another seven practitioners
had resigned in December alone.2 4 Later in the call, the executive
stated that this number of defections, while small relative to the total
215
number of Hanger practitioners, had "inflicted serious damage.,

207. Id. at 342.
208. Id. at 346.
209. Id. at 341. Before being acquired by Hanger, NovaCare itself had acquired over
ninety other orthopedic and prosthetic ("0 & P") businesses since 1992. Hanger
Orthopedic Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 30, 2000). With its
purchase of NovaCare, Hanger became "the leading provider of O&P patient-care
services in the United States." Id.
210. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 346.
211. Id. at 341.
212. Id. at 346.
213. Id. Notably, Hanger viewed its ability to successfully integrate acquired businesses
and operations as one of its "competitive strengths." See Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 30, 2000).
214. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 347.
215. Id. As of December 31, 1999, Hanger employed "approximately 962 practitioners"
in forty-one states and the District of Columbia. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 30, 2000). The acquisition of NovaCare apparently
marked the beginning of a period of slower growth for the company since, by comparison,
in its most recent annual filing, the company reported that it employed "in excess of 1,000
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This was in part due to the fact that a single NovaCare practitioner's
referral business could represent half a million dollars in revenue to
Hanger, with a similar impact on income.216 Based on these
revelations, plaintiffs brought suit for securities fraud violations.2 17
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint.218
The plaintiffs claimed that the November 1999 misstatement of
the number of post-acquisition practitioner resignations as ten instead
of eighteen or nineteen was a material misrepresentation that
understated the effect of these defections on Hanger's future
performance. 219 Hanger contended that any misstatement of the
number of practitioners who had left could not be material because
the company had accurately disclosed the impact of those losses on
revenues. 22° The Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs
that Hanger's statements about practitioner losses could cause a
reasonable investor to underestimate the effect on Hanger's financial
condition because the effects on revenues and earnings from the
additional practitioner resignations could well have been felt
primarily in future quarters. 221 Thus, the court of appeals ruled that
plaintiffs had adequately plead materiality.22 2
The court of appeals disagreed, however, that the complaint
established the requisite level of scienter because the facts plead were
"more consistent with negligence than with recklessness or intent. '223
The plaintiffs' inference of scienter rested on the grounds that Hanger
considered practitioner retention to be the driving factor for revenue
revenue-generating O&P practitioners" in forty-five states and the District of Columbia.
See Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 03, 2010).
216. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 347.
217. Id. at 342.
218. Id. at 352-53.
219. Id. at 347. During the November conference call, Hanger disclosed that the loss in
revenue during the third quarter from practitioner losses was approximately $8 million. Id.
Total revenue for that quarter was approximately $125 million. Id. at 341, 346.
220. Id. at 347.
221. Id. at 347-48. In its year-end results for 1999, Hanger reported that net sales
revenues almost doubled from the previous year, from $188 million to $347 million, which
the company attributed primarily to the acquisition of Novacare. Hanger Orthopedic
Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21, 23 (Mar. 30, 2000). Thus, future changes
in Novacare's revenues would have an accordingly significant impact on Hanger's
performance. See id.
222. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 349.
223. Id. at 348. Here, the court of appeals appears to adopt a Tellabs-style approach to
the scienter standard that culpable inferences must be at least as compelling as competing
inferences. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007); supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
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growth, that the company had tracked retention numbers month by
month, and that it had clearly recognized a negative trend by the time
of the first conference call.22 ' Although the Fourth Circuit conceded
that these claims gave "some indication" that Hanger stated the
number of departures recklessly, 2u it ultimately held that these
factors were outweighed by an inference of "mere" negligence
because: (1) Hanger couched its statements in rough terms rather
than precise figures; (2) the number of resignations was small relative
to the total number of practitioners nationwide, lending credence to
the possibility that the company simply miscounted; (3) Hanger had
disclosed at least some of the negative effects on revenues and
earnings from the losses; (4) there were no allegations of a long-term
or continuing conspiracy to hide the level of resignations; (5) plaintiffs
had not alleged any personal motivations by Hanger executives to
misstate the figures; 226 and (6) Hanger plausibly explained in its
November statement that it believed that no significant trend of
resignations existed. 27
In its discussion of the requisite pleading standards to establish
scienter, the Fourth Circuit not only expressly accepted the prevalent
standard of "recklessness '' 22s as a basis for the requisite mental state,
but it further adopted what it termed a "flexible, case-specific"
approach to determine if the facts plead collectively raised a strong
inference of culpability, thus rejecting the more lenient
motive/opportunity standard espoused by the Second Circuit.2 9
Interestingly, this standard again foreshadows the Tellabs standard in
224. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 348.
225. Id. Here, the Fourth Circuit relied on its earlier decision in Phillips. "In Phillips,
we defined 'recklessness' as 'an act so highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure
from the standard of ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the
extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant
must have been aware of it.' " Id. at 343 (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609,
621 (4th Cir. 1999)). This standard is consistent with that adopted by other federal
appellate courts. See, e.g., In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 667 (3d
Cir. 2002); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1977).
226. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 348. Again citing Phillips, the court of appeals opined that
personal motivation in this context includes conduct such as sales of executives' personal
stock, but it does not include "generalized corporate motives." Id. at 348 n.7.
227. Id. at 348.
228. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit reiterated the definition of recklessness expressed
earlier in Phillips: " '[Anact so highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure from
the standard of ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the
extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant
must have been aware of it.' "Id. at 343 (quoting Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621); see cases cited
supra note 225.
229. Ottman, 353 F.3d at 345.
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that the court of appeals was persuaded that the facts plead more
plausibly supported negligence than recklessness. While Ottman
presents a closer case than Phillips and reasonable minds may
disagree with the court's holding, particularly due to the fact that the
statements at issue here were demonstrably false and concerned an
issue that the defendants obviously tracked closely, the decision in
Ottman illustrates the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the federal
pleading requirements to stifle what the court perceives as the
invocation of section 10(b) litigation directed toward simple
negligence or inadvertent misstatement by alleged wrongdoers.
3. Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
In Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3' the Fourth
Circuit, in determining whether the subject pleadings established a
"strong inference" of scienter, affirmed dismissal of securities fraud
claims in light of the Tellabs decision.231 The defendant, Inspire
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Inspire"), developed prescription drugs for
the treatment of various eye, lung, and sinus diseases, including in
particular the drug diquafosol tetrasodium ("diquafosol"),2 32 designed
to prevent and repair long-term corneal damage from dry eye disease.
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Inspire after the company
announced in early February 2005 that diquafosol had failed to meet
an expected level of success in a series of testing to obtain approval
from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to market the
drug.233 This announcement precipitated a forty-five percent drop in
Inspire's stock price.'
In June 2004, as a final step to gain FDA approval, Inspire began
a series of trials labeled Study 109 that were intended to replicate the
results of a prior series of tests, Study 105, for a specific endpoint
objective.235 Inspire made "a handful of public comments" about
Study 109 in prospectuses for stock offerings that stated that Inspire
had a "clear understanding of the FDA's additional requirement" to
230. 549 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2008).
231. Id. at 620-21.

232. Id. at 621. Inspire is continuing the development of this drug under the trade name
Prolacria. Inspire Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Prolacria-Inspire Pharmaceuticals, http://www.
inspirepharm.com/r andAd/prolacria.php (last visited May 9, 2010). In January 2010, the
company announced the failure of a new series of trials with a specified endpoint of
corneal clearing. Id.; see infra note 237 (discussing corneal clearing versus corneal staining
as an objective endpoint for study).
233. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 622.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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approve the drug, and it referred to Study 109 as a "confirmatory"
trial.236 In addition, Christy Shaffer, Inspire's chief executive officer,
made statements in conference calls with investors and analysts that
237
led some stock analysts to speculate about the endpoint objective of
Study 109 and whether trials would likely meet that objective.23 8
Nonetheless, claiming competitive reasons, Inspire never publicly
confirmed the specific endpoint of the trial.239 While Study 109 was in
progress, Shaffer and two Inspire directors sold shares of company
stock ranging from three to thirteen percent of their respective
holdings.2 4 ° Unfortunately for Inspire, Study 109 showed that
diquafosol failed to meet the required level of success. 241' A week after
the announcement of the test results and the resulting drop in
242
Inspire's stock price, plaintiffs filed suit.
Like Phillips and Ottman, Cozzarelli illustrates the Fourth
Circuit's application of the PSLRA's stringent pleading requirements,
supported by Tellabs, to "screen out" a claim that the court of appeals
deems to be relatively weak. The court of appeals affirmed dismissal
based on the plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead scienter; the
inference of fraudulent intent raised in the complaint was not as
compelling as an inference of innocent conduct. 243 The claims of
scienter relied primarily on the personal and corporate financial
motivations that Inspire's CEO had to mislead analysts and investors
about the particular endpoint of Study 109, buttressed by the stock
236. Id.
237. The specific endpoint of Study 109 was to replicate the level of "corneal staining"
that the drug had achieved in Study 105. Id. at 621. Corneal staining is a procedure used to
measure damage to the cornea on a scale from zero to five, with a score of zero signifying
a positive result known as "corneal clearing." Id. Thus, an endpoint objective of corneal
clearing-as analysts openly speculated-would indicate that diquafosol was a more
effective treatment for damage to the cornea than would an endpoint of achieving only a
lower level of corneal staining. See id.
238. Id. at 622.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Inspire's stock price dropped from $16 per share to $8.88 on the announcement
that diquafosol had failed to replicate the corneal staining results of Study 105-a fortyfive percent decline. Id. Similarly, two years earlier, Inspire had enjoyed a forty percent
increase in the price of its stock on the news that diquafosol had achieved the primary
endpoint of corneal staining in that study. Michael Dunn, InspirePharmaceuticalClimbing
on Positive Dry Eye Results, THE STREET, June 18, 2002, http:/(www.thestreet.com/techl
marketmovers/10027764.html.
243. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 626 (concluding that "no strong inference of scienter exists
because the inference that defendants acted with the nonfraudulent intent to protect their
competitive advantage is more powerful and compelling than the inference that
defendants acted with an intent to deceive").
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sales by the CEO and other insiders. 2' Applying the Supreme Court's
instruction in Tellabs to look at the facts as a whole, including
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that analyst reports-when read in their entirety,
rather than simply portions quoted in the complaint-corroborated
Inspire's legitimate business reasons for not disclosing the precise
endpoint to be achieved by Study 109.245 As the court observed, while
analysts did opine regarding the endpoint for Study 109 (that the
endpoint was to achieve corneal clearing), these opinions were
expressly noted as based only on "assumption" and "belief. 24 6 The
analyst reports further indicated that Inspire had expended
substantial time and resources to determine what endpoint was
required to gain FDA approval, and it did not want to divulge that
valuable information to competitors. 247 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the inference that Inspire's statements were motivated
by a legitimate business concern was "more powerful and compelling"
than that of an intent to deceive the investing marketplace. 4 8
Turning to the CEO's alleged motivations to raise capital for the
company and increase her personal compensation (that was tied to
the performance of the company and diquafosol), the court relied on
Ottman for the proposition that these incentives exist in every
company, "thus add[ing] little to an inference of fraud. ' 24 9 Similarly,
the stock sales by executives were deemed neither "unusual or
suspicious," and thereby did not lend any weight to an inference of
culpable intent. 250 The court found the levels of sales-from three to
thirteen percent of holdings-"modest to de minimis," and it noted
that, while Study 109 was ongoing, each of the executives actually
increased their total holdings in Inspire.2 1 Further, two of the three
executives resigned "around the time" of their stock sales, "indicating
that their departures, rather than an intent to defraud, may have
prompted them to sell their stock. ' 25 2 The court found that these facts,

244. Id. at 625.
245. See id.

246. Id. at 626.
247. Id.

248. Id.
249. Id. at 627 (citing Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338,352 (4th

Cir. 2003)).
250. Id. (quoting In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir.
2005)).

251. Id. at 628.
252. Id.

1966

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

taken together, did not support an inference that the executives
53
intended to dump their shares at an artificially inflated stock price.
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit observed that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege the existence of any Inspire internal documents that

supported an inference of scienter. 2 As the court recognized,
however, such "smoking-gun[s]" are not required by Tellabs- 55
Unfortunately, as the Fourth Circuit declined to point out, such
internal documents normally are obtained pursuant to the discovery
process, to which a plaintiff under the PSLRA is entitled to invoke
only after successfully fending off a motion to dismiss. 6 Under such

circumstances, to fault a claimant at the pleading stage for failure to
discover such weaponry may be equated to requiring a batter to
decipher a "spitball" or "emery" pitch before the ball is thrown,25 7 or

to compelling a pitcher, without inspection, to prove that a hitter has
used a "corked" bat.258
253. Id.
254. Id. at 626 (observing that "plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of any internal
documents from Inspire").
255. Id. (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)).
The Tellabs Court stated that "[t]he inference that the defendant acted with scienter need
not be irrefutable, i.e., of the 'smoking-gun' genre" to meet the requisite standard that the
inference be "cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324.
256. Pursuant to section 27 of the Securities Act and section 21D of the Securities
Exchange Act, as amended by the PSLRA, there must be a stay of discovery "during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party
that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to that party." 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b)(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006);
STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 256.

257. A "spitball" is a pitch delivered after applying a foreign substance to the ball, such
as saliva or lubricating jelly, to alter the trajectory of the pitch. See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL,
MEN AT WORK 99-100 (1990). The "spitball" has been outlawed three separate times in
baseball, most recently in 1974. See Roger Angell, On The Ball, in ANATOMY OF
BASEBALL 199, 207-08 (Lee Gutkind & Andrew Blauner eds., 2008). An "emery pitch" is
a pitch delivered after the ball has been abraded, such as with an emery board or
sandpaper (also known as "scuffing" or "cutting" the ball), to alter its motion in flight.
Baseball Slang Dictionary from D-H: More Baseball Slang from Dinger to Horsehide,
http://baseball.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/baseball-slang-dictionary-fromdh
(last visited
Aug. 26, 2010); see also WILL, supra, at 99 (describing the aerodynamic effect of cutting or
scuffing the ball). Minnesota Twins player Joe Niekro was once suspended for ten games
after umpires discovered an emery board that Niekro had carried onto the field in the
pocket of his uniform. See Niekro Rejects Scuff Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1987, at A24;
see also Mischief on the Mound: An Abridged History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at D3,
available
at
http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2006/10124/sportslbaseball/24seriesside.htm
(describing famous instances of spitballs, emery pitches, and other prohibited pitching
practices).
258. A corked bat is a bat that has been altered by filling its core with cork to lighten
its weight, in the belief that this will allow the hitter to generate greater swing speed and
thus greater distance on hits. CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL 77 (Jonathan
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In addition to its approach to scienter for the section 10(b)
claims, Cozzarelli also demonstrates the particularly narrow "strike

zone" plaintiffs face in the Fourth Circuit in its adoption of more
stringent pleading standards for other "non-scienter" securities claims
such as actions under sections 11 and 12(a)(2). 59 The plaintiffs alleged
that Inspire had also violated these provisions by omitting to disclose
the primary endpoint of Study 109; according to plaintiffs, disclosure

of that information was necessary to prevent the statements contained
in the company's prospectuses from being materially misleading.2 6
The court of appeals similarly rejected these claims on the basis that

the complaint did not plead facts with sufficient particularity under
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). 26 1 The
Fourth Circuit held that this heightened pleading standard applied
even though the complaint " 'expressly exclude[d] and disclaim[ed]
any allegation that could be construed as alleging fraud' with respect
to the Securities Act claims."262

Reasoning that this "disclaimer" language was "conclusory," the
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' allegations "sound[ed] in
Fraser Light ed., 1997). For example, famous slugger Sammy Sosa was once ejected from a
game when his bat shattered on a hit to reveal cork in its center, thus triggering an X-ray
examination of seventy-six bats confiscated from his locker (all turned out negative). Ira
Berkow, At Crime Scene, Sosa Hears Mostly Cheers, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at Al. Rule
6.06(d) of the Rules of Major League Baseball prohibits the use of bats that have "been
altered or tampered with in such a way to improve the distance factor or cause an unusual
reaction on the baseball, [including] bats that are filled, flat surfaced, nailed, hollowed,
grooved, or covered with a substance such as paraffin, wax, etc." PLAYING RULES COMM.,
supra note 1, at 54-55.
259. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Exchange Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(2)
(2006)) provide a cause of action based on material misstatement(s) or half-truth(s)
contained in a Securities Act registration statement or prospectus. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(2)
(2006). These provisions are somewhat similar to the anti-fraud provisions of section
10(b), but they do not require a showing of scienter. See supra note 119 (discussing the
section 11 private cause of action).
260. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 629. Although the issue apparently did not arise in this
case, disclosure of all material facts about Study 109, including arguably its specific
endpoint, may have been necessary under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R.
229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2009), which requires disclosure of "any known trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations." See
In re Caterpillar, Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903, 908-12 (Mar. 31, 1992); SEC Financial Reporting
Release No. 36, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm.
261. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 629. FRCP Rule 9(b) requires that when alleging fraud or
mistake, "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
262. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 629 (quoting Consolidated Class Action Complaint
73,
77, Cozzarelli, (4th Cir. 2008) (07-1851)).
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fraud 2 63 and to allow such a complaint to survive on the lesser
standards of FRCP Rule 8 26 would defeat the purpose of the rule-to

"protect[] defendants from the reputational harm that results from

frivolous allegations of fraudulent conduct. 2 65 This approach sets the

Fourth Circuit apart from other circuits. For example, the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits hold that claims plead in this manner that are brought
under sections 11 and 12 require only notice pleading under FRCP

Rule 8 (i.e., when a complaint disclaims or disavows allegations of
fraud in connection with such claims).26 6 Accordingly, in comparison
to cases from these circuits, Cozzarelli displays the differing burdens
and varying "strike zones" that securities plaintiffs face between
jurisdictions.
4. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n of Colorado v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP
In Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n of Colorado v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP, 267 the Fourth Circuit once again considered
recklessness as a basis for scienter, as construed under Tellabs.2 9 In
263. Id.
264. FRCP Rule 8 requires that a complaint must state "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) ("[W]e assume, at least for
argument's sake, that neither the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] nor the securities
statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate
causation or economic loss."); infra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of pleading standards with regard to causation).
265. Cozzarelli, 549 F.3d at 629 (citing Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d
1273, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2006); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d
776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999), aff d, 352 F.3d 908 (4th Cir. 2003)).
266. See, e.g., Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that "[s]ection 11 only requires notice pleading under [FRCP Rule] 8 rather than the
detailed pleading mandated by [FRCP Rule] 9(b) or the [PSLRA]"); In re NationsMart
Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 316 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the complaint's express
disavowal of claims of fraud in connection with sections 11 and 12 avoided grounding in
fraud, thus triggering the lesser pleading standards of FRCP Rule 8); see also In re CINAR
Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting split of authority in
application of Rule 9(b) to section 11 and 12(a)(2) claims).
267. 551 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2009).
268. Id. at 306. Similarly, recklessness was the basis for the plaintiffs' allegations of
scienter in Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162 (4th Cir.
2007), another post-Tellabs case. See infra text accompanying notes 305-28 (discussing
Hunter in connection with causation). In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that because
the plaintiffs failed to establish that any statements made by the defendants were false or
misleading, the facts plead could raise no inference of either recklessness or intentional
conduct. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 184-85. Further, the court opined that even though the
plaintiffs alleged significant stock sales by insiders, the four-year class period during which
the sales took place rendered any inference of scienter indicated by these sales weaker
than the inference that the executives made these sales without culpable intent. Id. at 185.
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this case, the outside auditors, not the issuer, were the target of the
securities fraud claims. 269 The court ultimately found that the "most
plausible" inference raised by the facts plead was that the auditors

had been misled by the issuer, rather than that they were complicit in
any fraud or "so reckless in their duties as to be oblivious to
malfeasance that was readily apparent., 270 In the context of an
accountant's responsibility in a case of audit failure, the court held
that this standard required " 'more than a misapplication of

accounting principles.'

"271

The defendants, U.S.-based Deloitte & Touche, LLP and Dutch

firm Deloitte & Touche Accountants ("Deloitte"), were engaged as
outside auditors by Royal Ahold, N.V. ("Ahold"), a Dutch operator
of grocery stores and food service enterprises in the United States and
other countries.2 72 In this role, Deloitte counseled Ahold on whether
to report revenues from five separate joint ventures Ahold formed

with grocery store operators in Latin America and Europe over an
eight-year period beginning in 1992 on a consolidated or nonconsolidated basis.273 Since Ahold did not own a controlling financial
interest 274 in any of the five joint ventures, 27 5 the propriety of

consolidated reporting rested solely on the measure of control that
Ahold held over the operations of each venture.2 76 Deloitte advised

269. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 306.
270. Id. at 314.
271. Id. (quoting SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
272. Id. at 306-07.
273. Id. at 308-10. On a consolidated basis, Ahold would report all of the revenues of
the joint venture in its combined reporting, whereas on a non-consolidated basis, it would
report revenue only in proportion to its ownership interest in the venture. Id. Because of
the level of interests Ahold held in the joint ventures, a consolidated basis allowed the
company to double the amount of revenues it could report from each operation. Id.
274. A controlling financial interest under United States generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP") is defined as a majority voting interest, or as a general rule, direct or
indirect ownership of over fifty percent of the outstanding voting shares of a company.
Statement of Fin.
CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES,
Accounting Standards No. 94, § 13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1987) ("FASB 94").
FASB 94 amended various provisions of the earlier controlling provision, Accounting
Research Bulletin Number 51, by, among other changes, eliminating various exceptions to
the general rule. See id. §§ 9-10; see also CONSOL. FIN. STATEMENTS, Acct. Res. Bull. No.
51 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants 1959) (containing pre-amendment consolidation
standards). FASB 94 left intact, however, the exception to the general rule that
consolidation is appropriate "where control is likely to be temporary, or where it does not
rest with the majority owners." CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED
SUBSIDIARIES, supra, § 10.
275. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 308. Ahold held only a forty-nine percent stake in one of the
ventures, and it held fifty percent in the other four. Id.
276. See id.
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Ahold several months before the first joint venture was formed about
control requirements under U.S. and Dutch accounting rules, and it
further said that control could be demonstrated short of majority
ownership by factors such as a contractual agreement among the
parties.277 Despite this advice, none of the joint venture agreements
indicated that Ahold held control over their operations. 8
Ultimately, however, Deloitte relied only upon Ahold's
representations that it held the requisite level of control to justify
consolidation, and Ahold reported the revenues of the joint ventures
on a consolidated basis as they were formed.279 In mid-1998,280
Deloitte began to demand that Ahold provide substantiation for its
assertion of control in order to continue reporting consolidation of
joint venture revenues and to avoid restatement of prior years'
financial results. 281 After almost a year, Ahold managed to produce a
single countersigned "control letter" from one of its joint venture
partners that stated that in the event an issue arose where the parties
could not come to a consensus decision, "Ahold's proposal to solve
that issue will in the end be decisive., 282 It would take Ahold nearly
another eighteen months to obtain similar letters from three of the
remaining joint venture partners. 283 Deloitte accepted these
documents as substantiation for past and continued consolidation.284
Then, in 2002, Deloitte learned of a "side letter" to Ahold from
one of the joint venture partners that disputed the interpretation of
the joint venture agreement expressed in the control letter.285 Within
months, Ahold revealed letters to Deloitte from the remaining joint
venture partners that also disputed Ahold's claim of control. 86 Two
days thereafter, Ahold announced that it would restate its revenues

277. Id.
278. Id. at 309. For example, in one of the agreements, corporate decisions were to be
made by a unanimous vote of the board of directors, only three of whom could be
appointed by Ahold, while the other four directors were appointed by the co-venturer. Id.
at 308.
279. Id. at 309.
280. Id. at 308. Notably, this occurred after three of the five joint ventures were already
in operation and more than five years since the first joint venture was formed. Id.
281. Id. at 309.
282. Id. Allegedly, at least one member of Ahold's Executive Board, Jan Andreae,
"played a direct role" in drafting these letters. In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA
Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 838, 844 (D. Md. 2005).
283. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 309.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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due to improper consolidation. 2' The plaintiffs brought suit against

Deloitte under section 10(b) for misstatements in the audit opinions
that Deloitte issued concerning Ahold's financial operations, claiming
that Deloitte acted fraudulently with respect to the reporting of
Ahold's results on an

improper consolidated basis to inflate

revenues. 288 The district court ultimately dismissed these claims on the
finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead scienter.289
The Fourth Circuit began its review of these claims with the
recognition that under Tellabs, analysis of scienter must draw on both
factual allegations in the pleadings and other evidence in the record
to determine if an inference of scienter is " 'at least as compelling' "
as the inference of non-culpability. 290 Drawing on Ottman, the court
noted that recklessness can establish scienter when conduct is such an

extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care that it presents
a danger of misleading investors " 'to the extent that the danger was
either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must
have been aware of it.' ,291 Reviewing the facts alleged, the court
ruled that the "most compelling" inference was that the auditors had
287. Id. At the time, this disclosure was largely noted only in passing by the press and
investors since Ahold simultaneously disclosed other accounting frauds and errors that
would eventually erase almost $25 billion in revenues and over $1 billion from Ahold's
earnings. Gregory Crouch, Royal Ahold's Inquiry Ends, Finding $1.1 Billion in Errors,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at C2; see Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 307. These restatements of
revenue and earnings stemmed from the improper manner in which Ahold's subsidiary,
U.S. Foodservice, Inc. ("USF"), accounted for promotional allowances from vendors to
falsely increase revenues and earnings. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 307. Promotional allowances
are payments made to retailers by manufacturers or wholesalers, either in cash or in
discounts to purchase prices, in exchange for the retailer's advertising efforts to promote
certain products, such as through in-store displays and specials. Id.; Marianne M. Jennings
et al., The Economics, Ethics, and Legalities of Slotting Fees and Other Allowances in
Retail Markets, 21 J.L. & COM. 1, 6-8 (2001). In the retail grocery industry, these
allowances can contribute significantly to retailers' profit margins, but because
promotional allowances are often tied to sales volumes, these revenues are susceptible to
manipulation. See Jennings et al., supra, at 7-8.
288. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 313-14. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Central
Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994),
plaintiffs were required to demonstrate their reliance upon disclosure deficiencies made
by Deloitte in the audit reports themselves because simply aiding or abetting another's
violation was held not to give rise to section 10(b) liability in private actions. Deloitte, 551
F.3d at 313; see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 155-58 (2008) (holding that the conduct of secondary actors must independently meet
all elements of liability under section 10(b), including reliance).
289. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 308.
290. Id. at 312 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324
(2007)).
291. Id. at 313 (quoting Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343
(4th Cir. 2003)); see supra note 225.
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been misled by Ahold's "repeated lies and artifices," rather than that
they were complicit in any fraud or "so reckless in their duties as to
be oblivious to malfeasance that was readily apparent. 2 92 The court
conceded that Deloitte's failure to demand more evidence from
Ahold to support consolidation may have been improper, but that in
the context of accountant conduct, recklessness requires " 'more than
a misapplication of accounting principles,' ,293 but instead must
294
virtually "amount[ ] to no audit at all.,
While the standard of recklessness in cases of audit failure is
stringent,29 5 the court's analysis of the competing inferences in this
case nonetheless raises questions. First, the court did not address the
long period of time-several years, in fact-in which Deloitte relied
solely on Ahold's representations that it held the requisite level of
control over the joint ventures, despite having provided a detailed
letter to Ahold of the kinds of documentation that normally indicate
control.29 Second, when Deloitte did demand substantiation of
Ahold's level of control, the company produced weakly-worded
control letters, and then again only after significant periods of time.297
These delays and the uncertain level of documentation that they
ultimately produced should have caused Deloitte to suspect that
Ahold was belatedly negotiating the issue of control with its joint
292. Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 314.
293. Id. (quoting SEC. v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
294. Id. (quoting SEC. v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
Significantly, it was Deloitte's audit work that brought to light Ahold's fraudulent
accounting for promotional allowances, even though USF executives conspired with
personnel from several vendors to submit false audit confirmation reports to Deloitte in
the course of an investigation to substantiate USF's recorded promotional allowance
revenues. Id. at 309-10; see supra note 287.
295. Courts have held that liability is only appropriate where the defendant made
accounting judgments so far from the norm that no reasonable accountant would have
made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts-a standard that affords broad
protection in cases of audit failure. See, e.g., Ley v. Visteon Corp., 2008 FED App. 0360P,
11-15, 543 F.3d 801, 814-18 (6th Cir. 2008); In re Saxton Sec. Litig., 156 F. App'x 917, 920
(9th Cir. 2005), affid, 227 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2008); CL-Alexanders Laing &
Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 739 F. Supp. 158, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Recently, the SEC
incorporated such allegations into a civil enforcement complaint against David G.
Friehling and his firm, Friehling & Horowitz, CPA's, P.C., for their audit work performed
on behalf of Bernard L. ("Bernie") Madoff's broker-dealer firm, Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities LLC. Complaint at 11-14, United States v. Friehling, No. 09-MAG429 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
files/madoff-accountant-sec-complaint.pdf.The complaint alleges that Friehling and his
firm violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act in connection with Madoff's massive Ponzi scheme that resulted in billions
of dollars of investment losses to Madoff's clients. Id. at 4.
296. See Deloitte, 551 F.3d at 308-09.
297. Id.
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venture partners after the fact.2 98 Third, the court arguably extended
too much protection to auditors in particular by characterizing
Deloitte's reliance on Ahold's representations and scant
substantiations as nothing more than a "misapplication of accounting
principles. ' ' 299 Undoubtedly, an unduly broad application of this
standard, as perhaps illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision, can
be applied to shield virtually any decision requiring an auditor's
judgment or discretion in the performance of the audit, beyond purely
technical accounting treatments. Deloitte and the preceding cases thus
aptly illustrate the stiff hurdle that the Fourth Circuit's approach to

the element of scienter poses to securities plaintiffs, particularly with
regard to establishing recklessness as a basis for a defendant's
required state of mind.
C.

Causation

An additional element of a private securities fraud claim is loss
causation, or that a direct and proximate relationship exists between
the loss suffered and the defendant's misrepresentation or omission.3°°
For example, in Miller v. Asensio & Co.,30 1 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a jury verdict that found liability under section 10(b) but
awarded zero damages. 3°2 The court of appeals held that section 10(b)
contemplates this result.3 °3
The PSLRA does not explicitly address the element of causation
concerning the application of a stricter standard of pleading. Whether
FRCP Rule 9(b) should apply to this element in section 10(b)
litigation remains unresolved.3" In the case discussed below,
298. Id.
299. See id. at 314 (quoting SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)). Notably, in Price Waterhouse, in the context in which this language
arose, highly technical factors such as the proper method to account for a complex series
of leases, the correct level of bad debt reserves, and unreconciled intercompany accounts
were at issue. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1223.
300. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006); Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
301. 364 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 2004).
302. Id. at 225.
303. Id. at 231-32. The Fourth Circuit also declined to remand for a new trial on the
issue of damages. Id. at 234-35, 235 n.10 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); Teague v. Bakker,
35 F.3d 978, 996 (4th Cir. 1994)); id. at 235 (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Wanzer,
897 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1990)).
304. See, e.g., Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346, only assumed, without
deciding, that the less stringent provisions of Rule 8 should apply). In Berson, the Ninth
Circuit found it unnecessary to make an explicit ruling on which standard to apply since
the court of appeals held that the complaint satisfied the heightened pleading standard of
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Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana v. Hunter,0 the Fourth

Circuit considered this question and ruled that plaintiffs must
affirmatively plead facts that establish causation " 'with sufficient
specificity to enable the court to evaluate whether the necessary

causal link exists.' "I' Although the opinion is silent on what standard
should apply in this evaluation, it appears that the court of appeals
employed a ° "strong inference" analysis similar to its treatment of
materiality."

In Hunter, the Fourth Circuit considered securities fraud claims

that arose as the result of a dispute between two brothers, the cofounders of Cree, Inc. ("Cree").? After founding the company in
1987 along with his brother, Eric Hunter served as chief executive

officer of Cree until 1994 when F. Neal Hunter took over the position,
serving as chief executive officer until 2001 and as chairman of the
board until 2004."09 In 2003, Eric filed suit against Neal and other
officers of Cree, alleging violations of federal and state securities
laws, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.31 0

Although the suit was quickly settled, the allegations in the complaint
sparked a number of class action securities suits by purchasers of Cree
stock from 1999 until the filing of Eric's complaint in 2003, which the
court consolidated and considered together.3

FRCP Rule 9(b). Id. at 990. Other courts have adopted a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Cellular Tech. Services. Co. v. TruePosition, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 223, 236 n.7 (D. Conn.
2009) (failing to reach the issue because the complaint did not satisfy the more lenient
pleading standards of FRCP Rule 8); In re Dell, Inc. Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 906
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (noting the split of authority among district courts; opining that
language in Dura indicates that FRCP Rule 8 is the correct standard but that the
complaint failed that lesser pleading standard); In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F. Supp.
2d 266, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (assuming arguendo that FRCP Rule 8 applied, but other
deficiencies in the complaint precluded reaching the issue). See generally Matthew L. Fry,
Pleadingand Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-BasedSecurities Suits PostDura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 51-54 (2008) (asserting that neither the
PSLRA nor the FRCP require a heightened standard of pleading for loss causation in
federal securities fraud cases).
305. 477 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2007).
306. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 186 (quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172
(2d Cir. 2005)).
307. See id. at 184-88.
308. Id. at 168. Cree, Inc. manufactures semi-conductor devices and materials for use in
various light emitting diode ("LED") lighting applications such as automotive, gaming,
architectural, and general electronic components. Cree, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 1-5 (Aug. 19,2008).
309. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 168.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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The consolidated class action complaint, among other claims,3 12
alleged securities fraud violations of section 10(b) against Cree and
control person violations under section 20(a)313 against several of
Cree's officers and directors, stemming from Cree's transactions with
six other companies over a four-year span that the plaintiffs
contended represented "channel stuffing" schemes3 14 and "roundtrip" transactions3. 5 to artificially boost Cree's revenues.31 6 While Cree
312. The consolidated class action complaint also alleged violations of sections 18(a)
and 20A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78r(a), 78t-1(a) (2006), and section 304 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006), against various individual officers of Cree.
Hunter,477 F.3d at 169-70, 188-89. Section 18(a) provides for liability for materially false
or misleading statements contained in SEC Exchange Act filings that a purchaser or seller
detrimentally relied upon and that caused damages, unless the defendant can show that
she "acted in good faith and without knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a). Section 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a), establishes a private
right of action for insider trading on behalf of "contemporaneous traders" who traded
"the same class of securities on the opposite side of the transaction during the time that
the allegedly illegal inside trade(s) occurred." STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 377; see supra
notes 54-81 and accompanying text (discussing the "classical" and "misappropriation"
theories of liability for insider trading). Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates
that the CEO and chief financial officer (CFO) of a reporting company reimburse the
company for bonuses received and profits derived from personal sales of company stock
during any fiscal year where a restatement of financial results is required because of
misconduct or material non-compliance with SEC requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). This statute imposes liability against any person "who directly
or indirectly controls any person liable" for a violation of the Exchange Act (or any rules
or regulations promulgated thereunder), "unless the controlling person acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce" or cause the violation. Id.
314. "Channel-stuffing" is a fraudulent practice to inflate revenues by inducing
customers to order products in excess of their current demand (often through price
discounts or by granting an unqualified right of return) that allows the seller to record
current revenues from the sales. This practice may be designed to meet analyst
expectations or to conceal negative trends. See Hunter, 477 F.3d at 169; see also Broudo v.
Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that channel stuffing claims
may be probative of scienter if intent is to artificially inflate income), rev'd, 544 U.S. 336
(2005).
315. "Round-trip" transactions are an arranged series of related purchases and sales
between companies that lack any true economic substance, but they allow one or both
participants to fraudulently record additional revenues, typically to improve financial
statements or meet analyst expectations. See Hunter, 477 F.3d at 169. Such transactions
formed the basis of the allegations in Stoneridge Investment Partners,L.L.C., v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). In Stoneridge, Charter Communications, Inc.
("Charter"), allegedly agreed to overpay Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc. for
cable television equipment that it purchased from the two companies on the condition that
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola would then purchase advertising from Charter in an
amount equal to the overpayment to complete the round-trip. Id. at 152-54. While
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola followed generally accepted accounting principles and
recorded the sales and purchases as a "wash" transaction (that is, booked the transaction
as a pure offset with no effect on total revenue or expense), Charter both recorded the
advertising fees as revenue and capitalized its purchases of the cable television equipment
to overstate both revenue and net income. Id. at 155. In a 5-3 decision (with Justice
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had disclosed certain aspects of the challenged transactions in its
public filings, the plaintiffs alleged that the true character of these
dealings only became clear in light of the allegations made by Eric
Hunter, as an insider, in his complaint against Cree and its fiduciaries.
Because these allegations differed from what Cree had previously
revealed, those earlier disclosures allegedly were materially
misleading.3 17 Indeed, according to the court, news of the litigation
instituted by Eric Hunter "caused" Cree's stock price to fall the next
day by nearly twenty percent.3 18
The Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit on the basis of
several pleading defects,3" 9 including failure to adequately plead loss
causation.3 20 Drawing upon the Supreme Court's statements in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,321 the Fourth Circuit held that a
plaintiff must not only plead and prove loss causation, but also that
the element of loss causation requires that a complaint plead facts
establishing causation with sufficient particularity.322 The court of
appeals held that the plaintiffs had failed to plead causation under
Breyer not participating in the consideration or decision of the case), the Supreme Court
held that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola had no liability under a section 10(b) private
right of action for their role in the alleged fraud. Id. at 167. The Court reasoned that the
defendants' alleged misconduct was not relied upon by investors, thereby precluding the
imposition of primary liability. Id. at 164-67. See generally Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud
Not On the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 225, 242-43 (2008) (interpreting the Court's
ruling as demarcating the boundary between the sphere of publicly-available sources such
as prospectuses, financial statements, and proxy statements upon which markets place
reliance, and the sphere of secondary actors such as vendors and customers, accountants,
attorneys, and investment banks whose activities underlie those sources).
316. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 169.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 168 ("from $22.21 to $18.10").
319. Id. at 183-84. For example, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiffs had failed
to allege facts to support a reasonable belief that the statements at issue were in fact
misleading, and it further stated that the complaint failed to establish the strong inference
of scienter required under the PSLRA. Id.; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (2006)).
320. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 185. Loss causation is defined as a causal link between the
disclosure deficiency alleged and the loss suffered. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 341-42 (2005). While the PSLRA did not impose a stricter pleading standard for
causation as it did for scienter, the statute does provide that a plaintiff must prove
causation, which thus requires an affirmative pleading of this element. See 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 78u-4(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2010); Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346 (noting that plaintiff has
the burden to show that the alleged acts or omissions of the plaintiff "caused the loss for
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages"); see also supra text accompanying notes
179-299 (discussing Fourth Circuit decisions addressing scienter).
321. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
322. Hunter,477 F.3d at 186.
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this standard because, first, Eric Hunter's federal complaint made no
allegation with respect to the round-trip transactions, and second, the
transactions asserted to constitute channel-stuffing had already been
disclosed to the markets by means of Cree's SEC filings.3 23 The court
of appeals agreed with the district court's determination that "Eric
Hunter's complaint disclose[d] nothing new, but merely attribute[d]
an improper purpose to the previously disclosed facts. 32 4 Since the
market had no knowledge of the first category of transactions and had
already incorporated information about the second category, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that neither could have caused the stock
drop that followed Eric Hunter's lawsuit against Cree.325 In the view
of the Fourth Circuit, the drop in Cree's stock price "more logically
occurred" because the market recognized that a lawsuit by a founder
and former insider of the company could create significant instability
and disrupt the operations of the company, such that the loss resulted
from nothing more than generalized market risks.32 6
While the pleading of requisite causation alone would not have
saved the plaintiffs' complaint in this case,327 the court's approach to
this element merits scrutiny. Certainly, the fact that the Fourth
Circuit placed little, if any, regard in Eric Hunter's role as Cree's
former CEO raises some doubt about its reasoning. As the dissent
rightly noted, it would be difficult to "envision a more direct and
proximate causal link than an insider's disclosure of fraud that causes
a sudden and severe drop in stock price" to establish a reasonable
inference of causation under the normal pleading rules of FRCP Rule
8.328 But going further, it appears that the court of appeals here

323. See id. at 186-87.
324. Id. at 187.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 188.
327. See supra note 319. The lengthy dissent in this case, however, presented
compelling arguments that the complaint in fact did adequately establish both the
existence of material misstatements and a strong inference of scienter. Hunter,477 F.3d at
191-94 (Shedd, J., dissenting). Notably, the dissent appears to apply an analysis similar to
the standard that would be adopted a short time later in Tellabs by weighing inferences of
culpable and non-culpable intent to determine that, because of the identities and positions
of those entering into the channel stuffing and round-trip transactions, an inference of
scienter was more plausible than an inference of innocent conduct. See id. at 193-94;
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 208, 324 (2007).
328. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 194 (Shedd, J., dissenting). The dissent analyzed the
complaint's allegations of causation under FRCP Rule 8, which requires only a "short and
plain statement of the claim." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Under that standard, the dissent
opined that, based on the drop in Cree's stock price of twenty percent upon the public
disclosure of the information contained in Eric Hunter's suit against the company, "a
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applied not only the stricter pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) but
also a standard akin to the Tellabs requirement for scienter, as seen in
its conclusion that Cree's stock drop "more logically occurred" from
the market's fear of the general disruption Hunter's lawsuit could
cause, rather than the misconduct alleged by a former CEO. To the
extent then that Hunter can be read to extend the requirement that

plaintiffs establish an inference that is "more logical" or even "at least
as compelling" as competing inferences to elements of a securities
fraud claim beyond scienter (such as causation), it significantly
narrows the "strike zone."
V. BACK TO THE BULLPEN

329

As these cases and the attached empirical information in Table I
illustrate, plaintiffs in federal securities fraud cases have met with
sparse success in the Fourth Circuit over the last several years. This
occurrence is perhaps in large part due to the particularly narrow
"strike zone" created by the confluence of legislative and judicial
restrictions during that time, as well as to the stringent interpretations
employed by that court of appeals to both the substantive elements

and procedural provisions related to these claims. For example, many
cases from the survey period did not survive motions to dismiss or
summary judgment based on the interpretations developed by the
Fourth Circuit over time for the elements of materiality and
scienter, 330 or they failed to maintain class certification on appeal.331
reasonable inference of loss causation plainly exist[ed] under [the] facts [plead]." Hunter,
477 F.3d at 194 (Shedd, J., dissenting).
329. The "bullpen" (sometimes written as "bull pen") describes both the area where
pitchers warm up before taking the field and a team's staff of relief pitchers that can be
called on during a game. CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL, supra note 258, at
126-27; see, e.g., Tyler Kepner, Free-Spending Yankees Use Discount PartsIn the Bullpen,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at B12. The origin of the term is not entirely clear, although
some historians assert that it arose from the early days of the National League, when relief
pitchers would warm up near roped-in areas along foul-ball territories where fans who had
arrived late were penned in like livestock. CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL,
supra note 258, at 127. Others believe the term arose from the turn-of-the-century era,
when pitchers would warm up near "Bull Durham" tobacco advertisements painted on the
outfield fence. Id.; cf WILL, supra note 257, at 130-31 (describing the origin of the term
"bullpen" as "[o]ne of baseball's impenetrable mysteries").
330. See, e.g., Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 344-45 (4th Cir.
2003) (rejecting the Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity" pleading standard in favor
of "case-specific" analysis of scienter); Marsh Group v. Prime Retail, Inc., 46 F. App'x 140,
146 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Given the background of Raab and its progeny, we are constrained
to find that the alleged misstatements in this case are immaterial and hence not
actionable."); see also Svezzese v. Duratek Inc., 67 F. App'x 169, 172 (4th Cir. 2003)
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When viewed together with the narrow approach that the Fourth
Circuit has adopted for other elements of federal securities claims
such as loss causation-both in pleading requirements and in the
relative strength of the allegations required 3 32-- it appears that the
"strike zone" for plaintiffs could constrict even further. While this
may not come as welcome news for securities plaintiffs in the Fourth
Circuit, one can hope that even a "prolonged slump" cannot truly last
forever.333

(describing the "relatively lenient" Second Circuit standard as representing one end of the
spectrum of standards recognized by the federal circuit courts).
331. See, e.g., Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 189-92 (4th Cir. 2006);
Gariety v. Grant Thorton, L.L.P., 368 F.3d 356, 365-69 (4th Cir. 2004).
332. See supra notes 300-27 and accompanying text.
333. Although it may sometimes seem so. For example, as the Chicago Cubs began the
2010 season, they faced the prospect of seeing their 102nd year without a World Series
title. See Paul Sullivan, 'Failure' of 2009 Leaves Bad Taste: Cubs Begin Camp with High
Hopes, Lower Expectations,CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18,2010, at C1.
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TABLE I. SURVEY OF CASES FROM JANUARY 1995 TO JANUARY 2009
General Outcome

Case Name
Wassel v. Samuel

Fed. Sec. Disoosition
Summary judgment for
defendant

1

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

2

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Herman v. Legent
Corp.

Judgment as a matter of
law for defendants

3

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Wong v. Aragona

Summary judgment for
defendants

4

Unfavorable for plaintiff on
procedural grounds

Izadpanah v. Gross

Summary judgment for
defendants

5

Unfavorable for plaintiff on
procedural grounds

Allen v. Lloyd's of
London

Preliminary injunction
reversed and remanded
with instructions to
dismiss

* See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text for scope and methodology of goodfaith effort to locate all cases within the parameters of the survey, but no guarantee is
extended that all such cases have been located.
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Citation
No. 93-2635, 1995
WL 5772 (D. Md.
Jan. 9,1995)

Date Decided
Jan. 9, 1995

Court of appeals affirmed judgment as a matter
of law for defendants because statements of
future projections were immaterial, and
statements of past performance were not false or
fraudulent

No. 94,1445, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS
5568 (4th Cir. Mar.
20, 1995)

Mar. 20, 1995

Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
for defendants on securities claim based on
finding that loan agreement was not a security
within the meaning of the Exchange Act

No. 93-1667, 931998, 1995 WL
434829 (D. Md.
July 25, 1995)

July 25, 1995

Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
for defendants because statute of limitations had
run on securities claim

No. 95-1163, No.
95-1246, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1172
(4th Cir. Jan. 30,
1996)

Jan. 30, 1996

Court of appeals reversed preliminary injunction
and order to make Exchange Act § 14(a)
disclosures with instructions to dismiss case on
holding that United States federal securities laws
did not apply by virtue of forum and choice of
law clauses agreed upon by the parties

94 F.3d 923 (4th
Cir. 1996)

Sept. 3, 1996

Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)

Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
based on res judicata and affirmed FRCP Rule
11 sanctions
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General Outcome
Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Case Name
Gasner v. Bd. of
Supervisors of the
County of
Dinwiddie Va.

Fed. Sec. Disposition
Summary judgment for
defendants

7

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Banca Cremi S.A. v.
Alex. Brown &
Sons, Inc.

Summary judgment for
defendants

8

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Teague v. Bakker

Affirmed judgment on
verdict

9

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Hilton v. First
Union Corp.

Dismissal of complaint

10

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Phillips v. LCI Int'l,
Inc.

Dismissal of complaint

11

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Longman v. Food
Lion, Inc.

Summary judgment for
defendants

6
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Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)
Court of appeals affirmed grant of summary
judgment to defendant based on lack of
materiality and causation

Citation
103 F.3d 351 (4th
Cir. 1996)

Date Decided
Dec. 31, 1996

Court of Appeals affirmed grant of summary
judgment to defendants because of lack of
justifiable reliance due to investor's recklessness

132 F.3d 1017 (4th
Cir. 1997)

Dec. 30, 1997

Jury found interests in a vacation park did not
meet the Howey test (328 U.S. 293 (1946)) for a
security; court of appeals upheld adequacy of
jury instructions

No. 96-2186, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS
7079 (4th Cir. Apr.
8, 1998)

Apr. 8, 1998

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal on
determination that no misstatement or omission
existed

No. 98-1852, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS
15426 (4th Cir.
Mar. 22,1999)

Mar. 22, 1999

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal based on
lack of materiality and scienter

190 F.3d 609 (4th
Cir. 1999)

Sept. 15, 1999

Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
based on immateriality of alleged disclosure
deficiencies

197 F.3d 675 (4th
Cir. 1999)

Oct. 7, 1999
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General Outcome
Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Case Name
Krim v. Coastal
Physician Group,
Inc.

Fed. Sec. Disposition
Dismissal of complaint

13

Unfavorable for plaintiff on
procedural grounds

Gen. Conf. Corp. of
Seventh Day
Adventists v. Namer

Reversed summary
judgment for plaintiff on
procedural grounds (lack
of notice to defendant)

14

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Dellastatious v.
Williams

Summary judgment for
defendants

15

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Migdal v. Rowe
Price-Fleming Int'l,
Inc.

Dismissal of complaint

16

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Moseman v. Van
Leer

Summary judgment for
defendants

17

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Marsh Group v.
Prime Retail, Inc.

Dismissal of complaint

12
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Citation
No. 98,2361, 1999
WL 1008975 (4th
Cir. Nov. 8, 1999)

Date Decided
Nov. 8, 1999

District court granted summary judgment for
plaintiff, but court of appeals reversed and
remanded for lack of notice provided to
defendant

No. 9-2461, 2000
WL 543042 (4th
Cir. May 4, 2000)

May 4, 2000

Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment on
claims for control person liability under § 20(a)
of Exchange Act with holding that defendant
directors acted in good faith

242 F.3d 191 (4th
Cir. 2001)

Feb.22, 2001

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal of suit
against investment advisers under § 36(b) of the
Investment Company Act ("ICA"), because
plaintiffs failed to establish that fees were
excessive or that fund directors were
"interested" under the ICA

248 F.3d 321 (4th
Cir. 2001)

May 1, 2001

Court of appeals held that plaintiffs were bound
by signed release of claims based on reasonable
inquiry standard

263 F.3d 129 (4th
Cir. 2001)

Aug. 27, 2001

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal based on
immateriality of alleged disclosure deficiencies

No. 01 -2500, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS
17987 (4th Cir.
Aug. 30, 2002)

Aug. 30, 2002

Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal based on
immateriality of alleged disclosure deficiencies
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18

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Case Name
Svezzese v.
Duratek, Inc.

Fed. Sec. Disnosition
Dismissal of complaint

19

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Cohen v. USEC,
Inc.

Dismissal of complaint

20

Mixed outcome

Hayes v. Crown
Central Petroleum
Corp.

Affirmed dismissal of
complaint in part;
vacated and remanded in
part

21

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Robinson v. Glynn

Summary judgment for
defendants

22

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Mueller v. Thomas

Dismissal of complaint

23

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Ottmann v. Hanger
Orthopedic Group,
Inc.

Dismissal of complaint

General Outcome
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Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)
Court of appeals affirmed dismissal for failure to
allege facts giving rise to "strong inference" of
scienter

Citation
No. 02-1587, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS
11647 (4th Cir.
June 12, 2003)

Date Decided
June 12, 2003

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal because
statute of limitations had run; remanded for
FRCP Rule 11 sanctions findings

No. 02-1459, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS
14546 (4th Cir.
July 21, 2003)

July 21, 2003

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal of certain
Exchange Act § 14(a) claims based on lack of
materiality; vacated and remanded for district
court consideration whether other statements
contained in proxy statement were materially
false and misleading under § 14(a)

No. 02-2190, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS
21060 (4th Cir.
Oct. 17, 2003)

Oct. 17, 2003

Limited liability company interests at issue held
not to be securities within confines of Exchange
Act

349 F.3d 166 (4th
Cir. 2003)

Nov. 13, 2003

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal due to
plaintiffs' lack of justifiable reliance and failure
to allege duty to disclose, thereby rendering both
the alleged misrepresentations and omissions not
actionable

No. 02-2091, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS
25792 (4th Cir.
Dec. 19, 2003)

Dec. 19, 2003

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal for failure to
establish requisite "strong inference" of scienter

353 F.3d 338 (4th
Cir. 2003)

Dec. 22, 2003

1988
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General Outcome
Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Case Name
Poth v. Russey

Fed. Sec. Disoosition
Summary judgment for
defendants

25

Favorable for plaintiff but with
zero recovery

Miller v. Asensio &
Co., Inc.

Affirmed jury verdict
finding liability but zero
damages

26

Unfavorable for plaintiff based
on class certification issues

Gariety v. Grant
Thornton LLP

Remand for further
consideration on class
certification

27

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Jarmuth v. Charles
Schwab and Co.

Summary judgment for
defendant

28

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Keeney v. Larkin

Dismissal of complaint

29

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Nolte v. Capital
One Fin. Corp.

Dismissal of complaint

24
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1989

Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)
Court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
because plaintiff failed to establish falsity of
alleged written misrepresentations and could not
reasonably rely upon alleged oral
misrepresentations

Citation
No. 03-1308, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS
5861 (4th Cir. Mar.
30, 2004)

Date Decided
Mar. 30, 2004

Court of appeals affirmed jury verdict finding §
10(b) liability but awarding zero damages;
declined to remand for new trial on damages

364 F.3d 223 (4th
Cir. 2004)

Apr. 14, 2004

Court of appeals reversed and remanded to
district court for further consideration of class
certification; plaintiffs filed amended
consolidated complaint; majority of claims were
settled or dismissed (see Gariety v. Thornton,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31296 (S.D. W. Va. Apr.
3, 2006))

368 F.3d 356 (4th
Cir. 2004)

May 12,2004

Court of appeals affirmed grant of summary
judgment under § 10(b)

No. 04-1394, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS
11810 (4th Cir.
June 16, 2004)

June 16, 2004

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal due to lack
of materiality and failure to adequately plead
scienter

No. 03-2127, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS
14952 (4th Cir.
July 20, 2004)

July 20, 2004

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal of suit based
failure to plead falsity of alleged
misrepresentations with sufficient particularity

390 F.3d 311 (4th
Cir. 2004)

Dec. 2, 2004

1990
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GeneralOutcome
Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Case Name
Greenhouse v.
MCG Capital Corp.

Fed. Sec. Disposition
Dismissal of complaint

31

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

In re PEC Solutions,
Inc. Securities
Litigation

Dismissal of complaint

32

Unfavorable for plaintiff on
procedural grounds

Glaser v. Enzo
Biochem, Inc.

Dismissal of complaint
(of federal securities
claims)

33

Unfavorable for plaintiff on
procedural grounds

Hayes v. Crown
Cent. L.L.C.

Denial of leave to file late
appeal

34

Unfavorable for plaintiff based
on class certification issues

Gregory v. Finova
Capital Corp.

Denial of class
certification

35

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

Teachers' Ret. Sys.
of La. v. Hunter

Dismissal of complaint

30
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1991

Summarv (Fed. Sec. Claims)
Court of appeals affirmed dismissal because
alleged disclosure deficiencies were held to be
immaterial

Citation
392 F.3d 650 (4th
Cir. 2004)

Date Decided
Dec. 21, 2004

Court of appeals upheld dismissal based on
failure to plead scienter adequately

418 F.3d 379 (4th
Cir. 2005)

Mar. 18, 2005

Court of appeals affirmed dismissal of federal
securities fraud claims based on running of
statute of limitations, but reversed on dismissal
of state common law fraud claim

No. 03-2188, 2005
U.S.App. LEXIS
4598 (4th Cir. Mar.
21, 2005)

Mar. 21, 2005

Court of appeals denied appeal of dismissal of
federal securities suit because plaintiffs failed to
file a timely notice of appeal or obtain an
extension

No. 04-1425, No.
04-1505, No. 041709, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8280
(4th Cir. May 11,
2005)

May 11, 2005

Court of appeals reversed class certification of
suit under §§ 11 and 15 of the Securities Act

442 F.3d 188 (4th
Cir. 2006)

Mar. 14, 2006

Court of appeals held that plaintiffs plead only
general market risks instead of particularized
fraud and failed adequately to allege loss
causation

477 F.3d 162 (4th
Cir. 2007)

Feb. 20, 2007

L
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1992
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General Outcome

36

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

37

Unfavorable for plaintiff;
decision on merits

[Vol. 88

Case Name
Cozzarelli v. Inspire
Pharm., Inc.

Fed. Sec. Disposition
Dismissal of complaint

Pub. Employees'
Ret. Ass'n of Colo.
v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP

Dismissal of complaint
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1993

Summary (Fed. Sec. Claims)
Court of appeals upheld dismissal with prejudice
of suit for alleged violations of §§ 10(b), 20(a),
and 20A of the Exchange Act and §§ 11,
12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act based on
Tellabs standard and failure to plead with
specificity under FRCP 9(b)

Citation
549 F.3d 618 (4h
Cir. 2008)

Date Decided
Dec. 12, 2008

Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for failure
to establish requisite "strong inference" of
scienter

551 F.3d 305 (4th
Cir. 2009)

Jan. 5, 2009

1994
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[Vol. 88

